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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER ASAHI: THE
OTHER (INTERNATIONAL) SHOE DROPS
R. LAWRENCE DESSEM*
Over a quarter of a century ago, the Illinois Supreme Court made
the following observation concerning the rules of personal jurisdic-
tion:
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought
about by technological and economic progress, jurisdictional con-
cepts which may have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy
lose their relation to reality, and injustice rather than justice is
promoted. Our unchanging principles of justice, whether procedural
or substantive in nature, should be scrupulously observed by the
courts. But the rules of law which grow and develop within those
principles must do so in the light of the facts of economic life as
it is lived today.I
This articles analyzes the growth and development of the doctrine
of personal jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's consideration and
application of that doctrine in the recent case of Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court.2 Asahi is significant both because of the
nature of the suit and the nationality of the third-party defendant.
The Supreme Court for the first time directly addressed the consti-
tutionality of the "stream of commerce" doctrine of personal juris-
diction, a jurisdictional theory that has been employed increasingly
in recent years in products liability actions.3 Asahi also is one of the
few cases in which the Court has considered the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign country defendant.4
* Associate Professor of Law,, University of Tennessee College of Law;
B.A., 1973, Macalester College; J.D., 1976, Harvard University.
1. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432,
443, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
2. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
3. For an explanation of the stream of commerce doctrine, see infra note
58.
4. The phrase "foreign country defendant" is borrowed from Dean Peter
Hay and is used to distinguish non-United States defendants from "foreign defen-
dants"-United States defendants from a state or district other than the one in
which the forum court sits. Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Country Cor-
porate Defendants-Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REv. 431 (1984).
The Supreme Court's previous considerations of the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a foreign country defendant had come in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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This article considers not only the Asahi decision itself, but also
the personal jurisdiction cases leading up to that decision and the
implications of the case for the future development of the stream of
commerce doctrine. Thus, in the first section of the article, personal
jurisdiction cases prior to Asahi are set forth and analyzed. The
second section of the article then presents the Asahi decision itself.
In the third section of the article, the stream of commerce doctrine
is discussed and analyzed, insofar as that doctrine applies to cases
involving domestic defendants. The next section of the article dis-
cusses the additional problems presented by any attempted application
of the stream of commerce doctrine to cases involving foreign country
defendants. The final major section of the article then considers
some possible limitations upon the stream of commerce doctrine
other than those imposed by constitutional due process.
Both the stream of commerce doctrine and the attempts to assert
that doctrine against foreign country defendants should continue to
grow in importance as this country, and the world economic order
of which it is one part, approach the twenty-first century. The manner
in which the courts employ this doctrine will have profound signifi-
cance not only for our legal system, but for our economy and nation
as well. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Asahi gives at least
some preliminary indication of the manner in which these significant
issues will be addressed.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION CASES PRIOR TO AsAH-
A. Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in the Supreme Court
In order to fully appreciate the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Asahi, a short history of the development of personal jurisdiction
doctrine in the United States Supreme Court should prove helpful.5
Until midway through the twentieth century, the leading case
concerning the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction was the Su-
preme Court's 1877 decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.6 One commentator
5.. For general discussions of the evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine
in the Supreme Court, see Hay, Refining Personal Jurisdiction in the United States,
35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 32 (1986); Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien
Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 87-107 (1983); Weintraub, Due Process Limitations
on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV.
485, 488-512 (1984); Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 377, 380-83 (1985).
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The fact that a court constitutionally can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant does not necessarily mean that the substantive
law of that forum also constitutionally can be applied. Instead, the commentators
and the courts have differentiated between "judicial jurisdiction" (which concerns
the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction) and "legislative jurisdiction"
[Vol. 55
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has described Pennoyer as "not merely a venerable case. It represents
a particular way of looking at the law of jurisdiction." ' 7
Mr. Justice Field's majority opinion in Pennoyer was premised
upon "two well-established principles of public law respecting the
jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and property."18
These principles were (1) "that every State possesses exclusive juris-
diction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory"
and (2) "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory." 9 It was this latter
principle, established as controlling law in Pennoyer, that was to
shape the next sixty-eight years of personal jurisdiction doctrine. 0
Pennoyer's physical presence test, however, eventually proved
inadequate for a growing industrial nation." Consequently, working
(which concerns the constitutional limitations on choice of law). Martin, Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. Rsv. 872, 874 (1980).
The Supreme Court has held that "for a State's substantive law to be selected
in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 312-23 (1981). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 814-23 (1985); John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936);
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
Moreover, "[t]he Court has recognized that examination of a State's contacts
may result in divergent conclusions for jurisdiction and choice-of-law purposes."
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 317 n.23. See also Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 821; Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 n.27 (1958); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 590-
93 (1953). For an interesting discussion of "accommodation through choice of law"
upon jurisdictional analysis, see von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAgv. L. REv. 1121, 1128-34 (1966). For an examination
of the interrelationship of personal jurisdiction and choice of law concerns in the
Asahi case itself, see Cox, The Interrelationship of Personal Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law: Forging New Theory Through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
49 U. PITT. L. REv. 189 (1987).
7. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 241. For a recent analysis of Pennoyer and the facts giving rise to that case,
see Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction in
Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REv. 479 (1987).
8. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
9. Id.
10. Refusing to recognize the possibility of in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant not physically present within the forum state, the Supreme Court in
Pennoyer held that an Oregon court could not render a valid judgment against an
out-of-state defendant who had neither appeared nor been personally served within
Oregon. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 736. The Court, however, did recognize that a valid
in rem judgment might have been rendered had the Oregon court's assertion of
jurisdiction been based upon an initial attachment of defendant's real property
within the state. Id. at 727.
11. "Pennoyer's principle limiting the reach of state-court process proved
highly inconvenient in automobile accident cases and in actions against corporations.
The adjustment of these inconveniences culminated in an abandonment of the
principle." Hazard, supra note 7, at 272.
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within the conceptual framework established by Pennoyer, the Su-
preme Court gradually expanded the situations in which a defendant
would be considered physically present within a state and thus subject
to personal jurisdiction. 2
It was against this background that the Supreme Court in 1947
decided International Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 The defendant In-
ternational Shoe was a Delaware corporation, with its principal place
of business in Missouri. '4 The corporation challenged service upon it
by mail of a notice of assessment of delinquent contributions to the
Washington unemployment compensation system.' 5 International Shoe
argued that although it had systematically solicited orders through a
sales force within Washington, "its activities within the state were
12. Thus, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Supreme Court
upheld the assertion of personal jurisdiction by a Massachusetts court over a
nonresident motorist in an automobile accident suit. Jurisdiction was asserted
pursuant to a state statute providing that the acceptance of the rights and privileges
of driving within Massachusetts was deemed to constitute the appointment of a local
official as an agent to receive process in any case involving an accident within the
state. Id. at 354.
With respect to suits against foreign corporations, "For a long time the
inquiry was whether the local activity was sufficient so that it could be said that
the corporation was 'present' in the state, in deference to Pennoyer's major theo-
retical premise that presence was required." Hazard, supra note 7, at 273. See
generally Note, Due Process, Jurisdiction Over Corporations, and the Commerce
Clause, 42 HARv. L. REv. 1062 (1929). Moreover, the Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted corporate "presence" in some cases, thereby disapproving attempted
exercises of jurisdiction over corporate defendants. Lumiere v. Mae Edna Wilder,
Inc., 261 U.S. 174 (1923); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S.
516 (1923).
As in the case of nonresident motorist statutes, however, the Supreme Court
did uphold state statutes requiring foreign corporations to appoint a state official
as a corporate agent to receive service of process. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Chatters,
279 U.S. 320, 324-29 (1929); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917). The decisions in such cases were anticipated by
Justice Field's explanation of the Court's holding in Pennoyer:
Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require a non-
resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or
making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative
in the State to receive service of process and notice in legal proceedings
instituted with respect to such partnership, association, or contracts, ...
and provide, upon their failure, to make such appointment or to designate
such place that service may be made upon a public officer designated for
that purpose .... Nor do we doubt that a State, on creating corporations
... may provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their
obligations enforced, or their charters revoked, which shall require other
than personal service upon their officers or members.
95 U.S. 714, 735 (1877).
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
15. Id. at 312.
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not sufficient to manifest its 'presence' there and that in its absence
the state courts were without jurisdiction.' 16
While agreeing with International Shoe that "[h]istorically the
jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam is grounded
on their de facto power over the defendant's person,' '1 7 the Supreme
Court nevertheless rejected the company's challenge to personal ju-
risdiction. The Court concluded:
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.''"
The Court gave little guidance concerning when constitutionally
sufficient minimum contacts would be found to exist, merely stating
that "[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure."' 19 The Court found that, in the case before
it, International Shoe's "systematic and continuous" activities in
Washington satisfied the minimum contacts test and that the cor-
poration had received constitutionally sufficient notice of the action
against it.20
16. Id. at 315.
17. Id. at 316.
18. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
19. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. The International Shoe minimum
contacts test was formulated to test the constitutionality of the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, rather than the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has
held that "a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-
action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum contacts
with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
20. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. In its analysis of International Shoe's
contacts with Washington, the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe obligation which is
here sued upon arose out of those very activities [constituting the defendant cor-
poration's "minimum contacts" with the forum state]." Id. The case therefore
presented an example of that aspect of personal jurisdiction known as "specific
jurisdiction." See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n.8 (1984); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 6, at 1136, 1144-63.
The International Shoe majority, however, cited cases "in which the continuous
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature
as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities." 326 U.S. at 318. Subsequently, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed such cases, noting that "[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise
out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due process
is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction
1987l
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Supreme Court decisions subsequent to International Shoe have
been described by Professor Hazard as a "pointillist process of
locating particular cases on one side of the line or the other." ' 2' In
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,22 the Court noted "a
trend ... toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. ' ' z3 The Court ex-
plained this trend as follows:
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of
our national economy over the years. Today many commercial
transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties
separated by the full continent .... At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burden-
some for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity.24
In the case before it, the McGee Court found that the defendant
insurance company's solicitation of a reinsurance agreement with the
California insured, the acceptance of that agreement within Califor-
nia, and the defendant's receipt of insurance premiums mailed from
when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation."
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952). These latter cases represent examples of that aspect of personal
jurisdiction known as "general jurisdiction." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9;
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 80-81; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 6, at 1136-44.
For a recent critique of the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction,
see Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. REv. 610 (1988).
21. Hazard, supra note 7, at 274. After its decision in International Shoe,
the Supreme Court not only applied the minimum contacts test in various factual
settings, but also stressed the constitutional necessity of notice and opportunity to
be heard. As two commentators have noted:
To the extent that the common law approached jurisdiction to adjudicate
in terms of personal service on the defendant within the territory of the
judicial system, notice did not emerge as a separate problem. The asserted
basis of jurisdiction served a double function, both establishing the propriety
of exercising jurisdiction and notifying the defendant of the proceedings.
When other bases of jurisdiction are asserted that do not of themselves
notify the defendant, notice becomes a separate matter, and appropriate
notice will be necessary to satisfy due process requirements.
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 6, at 1134.
Thus, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme Court
held that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
22. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
23. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222.
24. Id. at 222-23.
[Vol. 55
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California constituted constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts.25
By its decision only one year later in Hanson v. Denckla,2 6
however, the Supreme Court made it clear that there remained
constitutional due process boundaries beyond which a state could not
go in asserting personal jurisdiction. 27 In Hanson the Court held that
a Florida court could not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction
over a Delaware trustee, even though the trust settlor had moved to
Florida and carried on trust administration from that state. With
respect to the settlor's activities in Florida, the Court said:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State .... [I]t is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. 28
Twenty-two years later, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 29 the Supreme Court relied upon Hanson v. Denckla in
striking down the attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction by an
Oklahoma state court over a foreign defendant. The plaintiffs in this
action had purchased an Audi automobile from the defendant retailer
Seaway in New York and subsequently moved from New York to
Arizona. 0 As they were driving this car through Oklahoma, there
was an accident which plaintiffs contended was due, at least in part,
to a defect in the car.' The plaintiffs filed suit in an Oklahoma state
court against Seaway, World-Wide Volkswagen (which was the re-
gional Audi distributor for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut),
Audi's American importer, and the foreign manufacturer of the car.3 2
25. Id. at 223-24.
26. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
27. The Supreme Court warned:
[Ilt is a mistake to assume that this trend [of liberalization of personal
jurisdiction requirements] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdiction of state courts .... However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to
do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are
a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 253.
29. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Two years before its decision in World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court had relied upon Hanson v. Denckla in Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko the Court held that the defendant
father's mere acquiescence in his children's move from New York to California to
live with their mother was not a "purposeful act" subjecting him to personal
jurisdiction in a California action for an increase in child support. 436 U.S. at 94.
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Writing for a majority of the United States Supreme Court,
Justice White concluded that Oklahoma's attempted assertion of
personal jurisdiction over Seaway and World-Wide Volkswagen was
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
World-Wide Volkswagen majority "[found] in the record before [it]
a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary
predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction." 33
The Court also refused to uphold personal jurisdiction merely
because it was "foreseeable" that plaintiffs' Audi would cause injury
in Oklahoma:
"[F]oreseeability" alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. . . 34 [T]he
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there. 5
By so restricting the foreseeability relevant for due process pur-
poses, the Court intended to permit "potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit ' '36 and to
prevent a situation in which "[ejvery seller of chattels would in effect
appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. 3 7 Under this
33. Id. at 295. Justice White's majority opinion also delineated several factors
that a court should consider in determining whether a state's attempted exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant with minimum forum contacts is constitutionally
reasonable. These factors included "the burden on the defendant," "the forum
State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies," and "the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Id. at 292.
The Supreme Court reiterated these same factors in its subsequent decision in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985). At least one professor
has criticized the Court for suggesting that "less than sufficient contacts can be
'made up for' by a strong state or plaintiff interest in the forum." Sonenshein, The
Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due Process Determination of Jurisdiction
Over the Person, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 47, 57 (1986). The use of just such a balancing
approach to determine the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction, however, has
been suggested by others. Jay, Minimum Contacts as a Unified Theory of Personal
Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429 (1981); von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 6, at 1172. The Supreme Court, though, made it clear in Burger King
that only "[oInce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State" is a court to consider "whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial
justice."' 471 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
34. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
35. Id. at 297.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 296.
[Vol. 55
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restricted view of due process foreseeability, the Court reversed the
judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court that had upheld personal
jurisdiction over the New York retailer and distributor."
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun each filed dissents.3 9
In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that a defendant should not
possess "an unjustified veto power over certain very appropriate
fora-a power the defendant justifiably enjoyed long ago when
communication and travel over long distances were slow and unpre-
dictable and when notions of state sovereignty were impractical and
exaggerated. "40
In his dissent Justice Marshall argued that it would not be
unconstitutionally unfair to subject the New York automobile retailer
and distributor to suit in Oklahoma:
[A] distributor of automobiles to a multistate market and a local
automobile dealer who makes himself part of a nationwide network
of dealerships can fairly expect that the cars they sell may cause
injury in distant States and that they may be called on to defend a
resulting lawsuit there. 41
38. Id. at 299.
39. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 317 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Despite Justice Brennan's concern
with "impractical and exaggerated" notions of state sovereignty, the World-Wide
Volkswagen majority asserted that the minimum contacts test was necessitated, at
least in part, by concerns for such state sovereignty:
The concept of minimum contacts ... can be seen to perform two related,
but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens
of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that
the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has redefined the rationale for the
minimum contacts test as follows: "The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes
and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985); Hay, supra note 5,
at 34 ("Despite earlier language in Supreme Court cases, it is now indeed accepted
that the jurisdictional due process issue does not implicate concerns of federalism.").
See generally von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. Rav. 279 (1983).
For an argument that personal jurisdiction doctrine should reflect notions of
territorial sovereignty, see Weisburd, supra note 5. For arguments to the contrary,
see Weintraub, supra note 5; Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Juris-
diction, 33 SYRcusE L. REv. 533 (1982); and Redish, Due Process, Federalism,
and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. Rv. 1112 (1981).
41. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19871
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Justice Blackmun joined in this dissent, and in his own short dissent
argued that the unique mobility of the automobile made Oklahoma's
exercise of jurisdiction constitutional.42
Although World-Wide Volkswagen subsequently became the ma-
jor precedent relied upon by both parties in Asahi,41 the Supreme
Court decided several other personal jurisdiction cases in the years
between those two cases. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S. A. v. Hall," the Court considered the minimum contacts doctrine
in a suit brought against a Colombian corporation in a Texas state
court. Finding that the foreign corporation's limited business dealings
in Texas did not support general jurisdiction over plaintiff's unrelated
tort claim, the Court held that the attempted assertion of jurisdiction
over the corporation was violative of the due process clause. 45
In two 1984 decisions, the Supreme Court considered the assertion
of long arm jurisdiction in libel actions. In Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.," the Court upheld the jurisdiction of a federal district
court in New Hampshire over a foreign magazine based upon cir-
culation of allegedly libelous magazines within the state. In Calder
v. Jones,47 the Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
a California state court in connection with libel claims asserted against
the editor and a reporter of the National Enquirer. The Court rejected
defendants' "suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into
the jurisdictional analysis," concluding instead that such concerns
were adequately addressed in the substantive law governing libel
claims. 4 The Court also refused to create a different minimum
contacts standard with respect to claims against corporate employees,
holding that the defendants' "status as employees does not somehow
insulate them from jurisdiction." 49
42. Id. at 317 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987). See
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 47, 702 P.2d 543, 549,
216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 391 (1985).
44. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
45. Id. at 418-19. The Supreme Court previously had held that a federal
court could sanction such foreign country defendants for failure to comply with an
order concerning discovery of jurisdictional facts by taking as established the
existence of personal jurisdiction. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
46. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
47. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
48. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
49. Id. Prior to Calder, some courts had adopted a "fiduciary shield rule"
under which "actions performed on behalf of a corporate employer [could] not
supply the necessary contacts for jurisdiction over an actor." Note, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary
Shield, 38 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1986). In Calder, however, the Supreme Court
implicitly rejected this rule, although it noted that corporate employees' "contacts
[Vol. 55
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In two 1985 personal jurisdiction decisions, the Supreme Court
applied the minimum contacts test in two other factual contexts. In
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,50 the Court held the minimum
contacts test to be satisfied in a contract action by the defendant
franchisee's business dealings with the out-of-state corporate fran-
chisor. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,5' the Court held that,
while absent class plaintiffs in a class action suit are entitled to
certain due process protections, they need not possess the same
minimum contacts with the forum that are required before personal
jurisdiction can be exercised over a party defendant.
Thus, while the Supreme Court has entertained many personal
jurisdiction cases in recent years, it has not established any bright
line test for determining the constitutional sufficiency of such juris-
diction. Instead, International Shoe's minimum contacts test has been
applied by the Court in a variety of factual situations. Perhaps
because of the flexibility and elasticity of this test, the lower federal
and state courts reached varied results in the many stream of com-
merce cases decided both before and after the Supreme Court's
decision in World- Wide Volkswagen.
B. Stream of Commerce Cases in the State
And Lower Federal Courts
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in World- Wide. Volkswa-
gen, the leading case involving the assertion of state long arm
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant was Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp.5 2 Gray involved a tort suit brought by a
with [the forum state] are not to be judged according to their employer's activities
there" but must be based upon their own forum-related activities. Calder, 465 U.S.
at 790. See also Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 n.13.
Thus "the fiduciary shield appears to be nearing its demise as a constitutional
doctrine," although "[s]tates with long-arm statutes that are not coextensive with
due process may continue to recognize the fiduciary shield rule without doing
violence to constitutional norms." Note, supra, at 839. See generally id.; Note, The
Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: Minimum Contacts in a Special Context, 65 B.U.L. REV.
967 (1985); Sponsler, Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Agent: The Fiduciary Shield,
35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349 (1978).
50. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
51. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
52. 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). For a discussion of the Gray case
and the Illinois long arm statute with which it deals, see Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
As Professor Currie has acknowledged, "Illinois was the first State to enact a statute
comprehensively dealing with personal jurisdiction and frankly attempting to occupy
the entire field of its constitutional power under the [then] recent liberalization of
the due process clause." Id. at 537.
Moreover, Gray itself is the type of case in which state courts have stretched
long arm statutes the farthest. "When a court sees blood on the ground, it is very
likely to find jurisdiction over a nonresident seller of the product that caused the
injury." Weintraub, supra note 5, at 516.
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woman who had been injured when a hot water heater exploded due
to a defective safety valve. 3 Among the defendants was the company
that had manufactured the valve in Ohio prior to its incorporation
into the finished heater in Pennsylvania and ultimate shipment into
Illinois 4
After concluding that the Illinois long arm statute extended to
such out-of-state activity resulting in a tort within Illinois, the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the valve company's constitutional due proc-
ess argument:
To the extent that [the valve company's] business may be directly
affected by transactions occurring here it enjoys benefits from the
laws of this State, and it has undoubtedly benefited, to a degree,
from the protection which our law has given to the marketing of
hot water heaters containing its valves .... As a general proposition,
if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another
State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage
caused by defects in those products. 5
In a second major long arm case decided by a state supreme
court, Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,16 a manufacturer of
pressure tanks was held subject to suit in California in connection
with a claim arising from the explosion of one of its tanks. The
California Supreme Court upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over
this foreign defendant even though there were no records indicating
how the tank came to be in California; jurisdiction was held consti-
tutional because Buckeye Boiler had sold a different type of tank to
another customer in California, thereby receiving approximately
$30,000 in annual sales. 7
Within the last decade, the lower federal courts have resolved
increasing numbers of the types of stream of commerce cases ex-
emplified by Gray and Buckeye Boiler. As the Supreme Court noted
in Asahi, "Since World-Wide Volkswagen, lower courts have been
confronted with cases in which the defendant acted by placing a
product in the stream of commerce, and the stream eventually swept
defendant's product into the forum state." 58 These cases may have
53. Gray, 22 11. 2d at 434, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
54. Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
55. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
56. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
57. 71 Cal. 2d at 904-907, 458 P.2d at 65-67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121-23.
58. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1032. A federal appellate court has explained the
stream of commerce doctrine and its development as follows:
The stream-of-commerce theory developed as a means of sustaining
jurisdiction in products liability cases in which the product had traveled
through an extensive chain of distribution before reaching the ultimate
consumer. Under this theory, a manufacturer may be held amenable to
process in a forum in which its products are sold, even if the products
[Vol. 55
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been spurred, at least in part, by the dictum in Volkswagen acknowl-
edging the constitutionality of stream of commerce jurisdiction:
The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expec-
tation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
Cf. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961).5 9
The federal courts of appeals were not in agreement concerning
the proper interpretation of this dictum in World-Wide Volkswagen
or whether the mere placement of a product into the stream of
commerce with the knowledge that the product would travel to the
forum state was a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. 60
Decisions in a majority of the federal appellate circuits upheld
an expansive exercise of stream of commerce jurisdiction, in several
cases premised solely upon a manufacturer's foreseeability or aware-
ness. 61 In Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp. ,62 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the
minimum contacts test was satisfied on just such a basis. The court
held that the Louisiana trial court could assert personal jurisdiction
over a Washington corporation that manufactured between 1000 and
were sold indirectly through importers or distributors with independent
sales and marketing schemes.
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
59. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
60. The validity, and scope, of the stream of commerce doctrine was fre-
quently litigated in the federal appellate courts, with every federal circuit deciding
at least one such case in the period between the Supreme Court's decisions in World-
Wide Volkswagen and Asahi. See cases cited infra notes 61-81, and accompanying
text. See also Montalbano v. Easco Hand Tools, 766 F.2d 737, 740-41 (2d Cir.
1985) (discussing stream of commerce cases and remanding for a further consider-
ation of whether stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction was applicable
to defendant importer).
61. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, two other federal appellate
courts adopted expansive interpretations of the stream of commerce doctrine sub-
sequent to World-Wide Volkswagen. In an opinion rendered only two months after
World-Wide Volkswagen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
upheld the exercise of long arm jurisdiction by a Kentucky federal court over a
German manufacturer of a pistol that paralyzed the tort plaintiff. Poyner v. Erma
Werke, GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
subsequently also rejected the argument that minimum contacts were not established
merely because the products of the defendant Australian wine producers were
imported and distributed in the United States by an independent concern. Stabili-
sierungsfonds fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203-
07 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
62. 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984).
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15,000 steel castings per year, two of which were sold to a California
manufacturer and incorporated into a dredge that later malfunctioned
in Louisiana.63 As in Asahi, it was the defendant manufacturers,
rather than the original plaintiff, that brought third-party actions
against the castings manufacturer."
Perhaps the most far-reaching federal appellate decision prior to
Asahi was the Ninth Circuit's 1983 decision in Hedrick v. Daiko
Shoji Co. 65 In Hedrick the court of appeals held that an Oregon
district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese
manufacturer of a defective cable splice that snapped, resulting in
severe injury to an Oregon longshoreman who was working on the
ship. 6 The court held that the Japanese manufacturer "performed a
forum-related act when it produced a splice that it knew was destined
for ocean-going vehicles serving United States ports, including those
of Oregon ' 67 and that "[t]he splice caused an injury to Hedrick in
a port that was within the expected service area of [the manufactur-
er's] customers." 68 Thus the Ninth Circuit concluded that the requisite
minimum contacts with the Oregon forum existed, despite the fact
that the defective cable was merely used, rather than sold, within
the forum state. 69
63. Bean Dredging, 744 F.2d at 1083-85.
64. In resolving this case, the Fifth Circuit relied upon its earlier decision in
Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980). In this earlier decision the
court had upheld personal jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation that had man-
ufactured several million cigarette lighters, one of which allegedly malfunctioned
and injured plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit, writing shortly after the Supreme Court's
decision in World-Wide Volkswagen, held that although there was nothing in the
record indicating any actual knowledge by the defendant corporation that one of
its lighters would be sold in the forum state of Texas, the manufacturer "should
have known" that its products would reach that forum because of its use of a
nationwide distributor and sale of its lighters to a corporation with "national retail
outlets." 616 F.2d at 198-200.
65. 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983), modified, in part, on other grounds, 733
F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1984).
66. Hedrick, 715 F.2d at 1356.
67. Id. at 1358.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Hedrick court also concluded not only that the necessary
minimum contacts were present, but also that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the Japanese manufacturer would not be unreasonable. Id. at 1358-59. In
making this determination, the court considered the seven factors previously set
forth in Insurance Co. of N. America v. Marina Salina Cruz:
(A) the extent of the purposeful interjection into the forum state .. .; (B)
the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum .. .; (C) the extent
of conflict with the sovereignty of defendant's state .. .; (D) the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute ... ; (E) the most efficient
judicial resolution of the controversy ... ; (F) the importance of the forum
to plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief ... ; and (G) the
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also
upheld personal jurisdiction against a foreign country defendant in
Nelson ex rel. Carson v. Park Industries, Inc. 70 The claim in Nelson
was brought by Wisconsin plaintiffs against, inter alia, the Hong
Kong companies that manufactured and distributed to an American
retailer a flannel shirt that ignited and burned a child. The court of
appeals distinguished the Hong Kong defendants from the automobile
distributor and retailer in World-Wide Volkswagen "because [the
Hong Kong companies] are early actors in a distribution system
which places and moves the product in the stream of commerce.
World-Wide Volkswagen is also different because the allegedly de-
fective product here not only caused the injury in the forum, but it
was also purchased here." ' 71
In contrast with the above decisions were opinions in the Third,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits that adopted a significantly narrower
interpretation of the stream of commerce doctrine. 72 Contrary to the
determination of the Ninth Circuit in Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co.,73
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
existence of an alternative forum.
Insurance Co. of N. America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir.
1981).
70. 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
71. Nelson, 717 F.2d at 1126. Contrasting the Hong Kong defendants with
the petitioners in World-Wide Volkswagen, the court of appeals also noted:
[T]he relevant scope is generally broader with respect to manufacturers and
primary distributors of products who are at the start of a distribution
system and who thereby serve, directly or indirectly, and derive economic
benefit from a wider market. Such manufacturers and distributors purposely
conduct their activities to make their product available for purchase in as
many forums as possible. For this reason, a manufacturer or primary
distributor may be subject to a particular forum's jurisdiction when a
secondary distributor and retailer are not, because the manufacturer and
primary distributor have intended to serve a broader market and they derive
direct benefits from serving that market.
Id. at 1125-26.
72. In addition, prior to Asahi several federal appellate decisions in other
circuits had rejected stream of commerce personal jurisdiction based on the facts
of particular cases. Chung v. NANA Dev. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 431 (1986) (Alaska corporation had not subjected itself to long
arm jurisdiction of Virginia by single shipment of reindeer antlers into that state);
Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (manufacturer's
sale of two helicopters, one of which ultimately crashed in Puerto Rico, was an
"isolated splash" rather than the placement of a product into the stream of commerce
so as to subject manufacturer to personal jurisdiction in Puerto Rico); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 853 (1986) (Pennsylvania manufacturer had insufficient contacts
with Utah to subject it to tort suit in that state).
73. 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983), modified, in part, on other grounds, 733
F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1984).
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a New Jersey federal court could not constitutionally assert jurisdic-
tion over a Japanese corporation that, in Japan, had converted a
ship into an automobile carrier.7 The court of appeals held that even
though the Japanese defendant "could have foreseen that a ship of
this size was capable of transporting cars to any port in the world,
• .. [t]he fortuitous circumstance that the owners chose to dock in
New Jersey [where the plaintiff longshoreman was injured] is insuf-
ficient to support the assertion of jurisdiction over Hitachi under the
New Jersey long-arm rule." ' 75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
very shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in Asahi, also
refused to uphold the assertion of personal jurisdiction by an Ala-
bama corporation over a Nebraska manufacturer.16 The court held
that the Nebraska corporation had insufficient contacts with Ala-
bama, even though it had had business dealings with the Alabama
plaintiff for five years and had shipped 2400 allegedly defective
pulleys to the plaintiff in Alabama. 77
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
had adopted a rather restrictive interpretation of the stream of
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction both before78 and after 79
the Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen. The latter
of these decisions, Humble v. Toyota Motor Co.,80 involved an
attempt to assert a products liability claim against a Japanese man-
ufacturer of component parts. The Eighth Circuit held that personal
jurisdiction could not be constitutionally asserted even though a
substantial portion of the defendant's business was attributable to
sales of automobile seats to Toyota Motor Company, which incor-
porated many of these seats into cars exported to the United States.81
It was against this backdrop of differing interpretations of the
stream of commerce doctrine of personal jurisdiction that the Su-
74. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
75. DeJames, 654 F.2d at 286. Subsequently, in Max Daetwyler Corp. v.
Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985), the Third
Circuit again refused to uphold personal jurisdiction premised upon "an expansive
application of the 'stream of commerce' theory" under which "jurisdiction [would
exist] because [the German manufacturer] ... participated in a distributive chain
which might reasonably anticipate sales of [the manufacturer's] products in major
industrial markets." Meyer, 762 F.2d at 298.
76. Banton Indus., Inc. v. Dimatic Die & Tool Co., 801 F.2d 1283 (lth
Cir. 1986).
77. Dimatic Die, 801 F.2d at 1284.
78. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
79. Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
80. 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
81. Id. at 710-11.
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preme Court was presented with the case of Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court.
8 2
II. THE AsAm CASE
A. The Facts
In September 1978, Gary Zurcher was seriously injured, and his
wife was killed, when the motorcycle that they were riding crashed
into a tractor trailer on a California highway. 3 Zurcher filed a
products liability action in the California state courts, alleging that
the accident had been caused by the explosion of the rear tire of his
motorcycle due to defects in the motorcycle tire, tube, and sealant.84
Among the defendants named by Zurcher was Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese corporation that had manufac-
tured the motorcycle tube.85
Cheng Shin subsequently filed a third-party cross-complaint against
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the Japanese corporation that man-
ufactured the valve assembly of the allegedly defective motorcycle
tube. 86 When Zurcher's original action subsequently was settled and
dismissed, the indemnity claim of Cheng Shin remained pending in
the California courts against Asahi. 87
Asahi filed a motion to quash the service of this third-party
complaint, arguing that the California courts could not constitution-
ally exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign country corporation
with no direct contacts with California. 88 In support of this motion,
Asahi filed affidavits indicating that, although it had sold motorcycle
tire valves to Cheng Shin for a period of several years, all such sales
were made in Taiwan and all the shipments of the valves were from
Asahi in Japan to Cheng Shin in Taiwan.89 Additionally, these sales
82. 107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987).
83. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1029 (1987).
84. Id. at 1029.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1029-30.
87. Id. at 1030.
88. Id. Normally, in determining the constitutionality of a state court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction, two separate questions must be answered: (1)
whether the state's long arm statute provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
in the instant case; and (2) if the long arm statute does contemplate the exercise of
personal jurisdiction, whether such jurisdiction is constitutional. See World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290 (1980). However, the California long
arm statute employed in Asahi authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction "on
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). Accordingly, the issue in Asahi concerned
only the constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi.
89. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
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of tire valves to Cheng Shin accounted for only 1.24 percent of
Asahi's total income for 1981 and only 0.44 percent of Asahi's total
income for 1982.90 Finally, as the President of Asahi stated in one
of his affidavits:
ASAHI does not do business in California. It has no office in
California. It has no agents in California. It has no employees in
California. It does not advertise in California. It does not solicit
business in California. It owns no property in California .... It
would be extremely inconvenient and burdensome for ASAHI to
enter into this litigation in California for a claim unrelated to any
conduct of ASAHI outside of JAPAN. 91
In opposing the motion to quash, Cheng Shin relied upon the
fact that it had purchased from 100,000 to 500,000 valve assemblies
from Asahi each year from 1978 through 1982.92 Moreover, a Cheng
Shin official stated in an affidavit that "Asahi was fully aware that
valve stem assemblies sold to my Company and to others would end
up throughout the United States and in California." 93 In addition to
this affidavit, one of Cheng Shin's attorneys filed declarations with
the California Superior Court in which he described surveys of two
California businesses dealing in motorcycle tires. 94 At the first of
these stores the attorney counted approximately 250 motorcycle tire
tubes with Asahi valves, while at the other California business twenty-
two percent of the approximately 100 tubes manufactured in either
Japan or Taiwan had Asahi valves. 95
Based upon this record, the California Superior Court denied
Asahi's motion to quash, 96 but the Court of Appeal of the State of
California granted a writ of mandate compelling the Superior Court
to quash the summons.97 The case then was appealed to the California
Supreme Court. 98
B. The Decision of the California Supreme Court"
In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Bird, the California
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, finding no constitu-
90. Id.
91. November 30, 1982, Affidavit of Kazuo Matsuoka in Support of Motion
to Quash Service, at 3, Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180 (Cal.
Super. Ct. April 20, 1983).
92. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
93. Id.
94. Respondent's Brief, apps. B, C, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (No. 85-693). See also 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
95. Respondent's Brief, apps. B, C, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (No. 85-693). See also 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
96. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030; Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No.
76180 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 20, 1983).
97. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
No. A022366 (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 15, 1983).
98. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
99. For commentary on the California Supreme Court's decision in Asahi,
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tional problem with the Superior Court's exercise of personal juris-
diction over Asahi.00 The court distinguished World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson'0 on the grounds that the defective car in that case had
not been sold within the forum state but had been brought into that
state by the car's purchaser.10 2 The majority held that "[g]iven the
-substantial nature of Asahi's indirect business with California, and
its expectation that its product would be sold in the state, Asahi
'should reasonably [have] anticipate[d] being haled into court
[here]."' 103
The court also rejected Asahi's argument that it had not "pur-
posefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State."' ° The majority instead concluded:
That requirement is satisfied where, as here, a component parts
manufacturer intentionally sells its products to another manufac-
turer, knowing that the component parts will be incorporated into
finished products sold in the forum state. In such a situation, the
component part manufacturer can structure its conduct to protect
itself from the risk of liability in the forum state. 05
Not only did the California Supreme Court therefore find that
Asahi possessed constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with
California, but the majority also held that exercise of jurisdiction
over Asahi was both "fair and reasonable."' 1 6 Accordingly, the
California Supreme Court concurred with the superior court that the
summons served upon Asahi should not be quashed.107
see Kennedy, Stretching the Long-Arm in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court: Worldwide Jurisdiction After World- Wide Volkswagen?, 4 B.U. Irr'L L.J.
327 (1986); Note, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: Minimum Contacts
in California Become Minimal, 22 WMLLAMETTE L. REV. 589 (1986); California
Supreme Court Survey: June 1985-August 1985, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 427, 443-
48 (1986).
100. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543,
216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985).
101. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
102. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 47-48, 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
103. Id. at 48, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
104. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
105. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 50, 702 P.2d at 551, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
106. Id. at 52-53, 702 P.2d at 552-53, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95. Though the
California plaintiff had settled his claims, the court found that California had several
interests in asserting jurisdiction over Asahi. The court held that California had a
strong interest in adjudicating claims such as Cheng Shin's in order to (1) protect
its consumers by insuring compliance by foreign manufacturers with California
safety standards, (2) efficiently resolve litigation in which most of the evidence lies
within California, and (3) prevent inconsistent verdicts by adjudicating all third-
party cross-claims in the same forum. Id. at 53, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
395.
107. Id. at 53-54, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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Justices Lucas and Mosk dissented, arguing that personal juris-
diction could not be constitutionally exercised because "Asahi at best
foresaw that some valves would be sold in California but it in no
way purposefully availed itself of conducting business in California
nor exerted any effort to serve the California market." ' Moreover,
the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority's conclusion "that
California may fairly and reasonably exercise jurisdiction." 109 Justice
Lucas criticized the majority's holding as follows:
The net result of the majority's decision is that a Taiwanese
corporation can litigate in California against a Japanese corporation
that has absolutely no connection with California in a case in which
the California plaintiffs have declared themselves made whole.
Surely our overburdened courts should be concerned with disputes
that more directly involve California." 0
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari to review this decision of the California Supreme Court."'
C. The Decision of the United States Supreme Court
In her Supreme Court opinion, Justice O'Connor described the
issue in Asahi as:
[W]hether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant
that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside
the United States would reach the forum state in the stream of
commerce constitutes "minimum contacts" between the defendant
and the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction "does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ' ' 1 2
Although all nine justices agreed that the exercise of personal juris-
diction offended constitutional due process on the particular facts of
this case," 3 the Supreme Court was badly divided on the other
jurisdictional aspects of the case.
All but Justice Scalia joined in that portion of Justice O'Connor's
opinion concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
108. Id. at 55, 702 P.2d at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 55, 702 P.2d at 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 56, 702 P.2d at 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
111. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986).
112. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1029 (1987)
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940))).
113. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033-35. Although Justice Scalia did not join with
the other eight justices in holding that California's attempted exercise of personal
jurisdiction was constitutionally unreasonable and unfair, id., he concurred with
that portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion finding constitutionally insufficient
minimum contacts. Id. at 1031-33.
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Asahi "would offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."11' 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the
burden on the defendant of defending in the forum state, the interests
of the forum state and plaintiff, and the interests of other states and
nations in the resolution of the controversy." 5
Justice O'Connor initially considered the "severe" burden Cali-
fornia litigation would place upon Asahi and noted that "[t]he unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal
system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness
of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national
borders."1 6
In contrast to the heavy burden placed upon Asahi, the Court
believed that the interests of both "the plaintiff and the forum in
California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi are slight. ' " 7 The
Court found to be particularly significant both the fact that the
claims of the California plaintiff had been settled and the absence
of any showing that it would be more convenient for Cheng Shin to
litigate its claim against Asahi in California rather than in Japan or
Taiwan."'
Finally, the Supreme Court was very concerned about the "pro-
cedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are
affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the California court.""' 9
The Court therefore concluded that "[clonsidering the international
context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight
interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would
be unreasonable and unfair." 20
In contrast to the consensus among the justices concerning the
unfairness of California's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
114. Id. at 1033 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
115. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033-35.
116. Id. at 1034.
117. Id.
118. Id. The Court also questioned the conclusion of the California Supreme
Court that California "had an interest in 'protecting its consumers by ensur-
ing that foreign manufacturers comply with the state's safety standards."' Id.
(quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d at 49, 702 P.2d at
550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392). The Supreme Court suggested that "it is not at all
clear at this point that California law should govern the question whether a Japanese
corporation should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the basis of a sale made
in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan to Taiwan." Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
119. Id. The Court sounded a note of caution on this point: "Great care and
reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into
the international field." Id. at 1035 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank,
379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
120. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035.
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Asahi, there was no majority opinion with respect to the question
of whether Asahi's contacts with California satisfied International
Shoe's minimum contacts test.' 2 1 Justice O'Connor, writing for her-
self, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia, con-
cluded that any attempt by California to exercise personal jurisdiction
over Asahi would be unconstitutional because of the insufficiency of
Asahi's contacts with that state. 12
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor rejected Cheng Shin's reliance
on lower court stream of commerce decisions:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without
more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State [necessary for a finding of constitutionally sufficient
minimum contacts] .... [A] defendant's awareness that the stream
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State
does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream
into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.'23
Because of Asahi's lack of direct contacts with California, Justice
O'Connor concluded that "the exertion of personal jurisdiction over
Asahi by the Superior Court of California exceeds the limits of Due
Process. " 2
Although concurring in the Court's judgment and in the conclu-
sion that California's attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction was
unreasonable and unfair, Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion
in which he disagreed with Justice O'Connor's resolution of the
stream of commerce issue. 25 In this separate concurrence, in which
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined, Brennan rejected
any requirement that there be "additional [defendant] conduct"
beyond merely "placing [a] product into the stream [of commerce]"
before the forum contacts are considered constitutionally sufficient. 2 6
Justice Brennan argued, instead, that World-Wide Volkswagen "pre-
served the stream-of-commerce theory" for cases such as Asahi in
121. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that "[t]he uncertainties involved
in deciding whether minimum contacts exist probably will lead courts to avoid the
issue whenever they can rule out jurisdiction on the ground of unreasonableness."
The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L. REV. 119, 266
(1987). Another author has suggested that "the doctrinal division over the stream
of commerce theory in Asahi makes assertion of jurisdiction uncertain and conse-
quently increases the costs of doing business." Recent Development, Personal
Jurisdiction, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 929 (1987). See also id. at 930, n.76 (collecting
state and lower federal court cases adopting differing interpretations of Asahi).
122. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1031-33.
123. Id. at 1033.
124. Id.
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which the allegedly defective goods "reach a distant State through a
chain of distribution" rather than "because a consumer . .. took
them there.
127
Justice Stevens also filed a short and somewhat cryptic concur-
rence, in which he, too, agreed that the decision of the California
Supreme Court should be reversed because the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable and unfair. 12 How-
ever, Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice O'Connor's stream of
commerce analysis for two reasons.
First of all, Stevens argued that, because the Court was in
agreement that subjecting Asahi to suit in California would be
unreasonable and unfair, it was unnecessary to consider the suffi-
ciency of Asahi's contacts with California. 29 Secondly, Stevens as-
serted that even if the "purposeful availment" test had been properly
formulated by Justice O'Connor, such a test was not correctly applied
in this case.'30 Instead, Stevens contended that Asahi's conduct con-
stituted more than "mere awareness" that its valves had entered the
stream of commerce, and he proposed a test for determining "pur-
poseful availment" under which "the volume, the value, and the
hazardous character of the components" would be considered.'
Without definitely resolving the issue, Stevens suggested that "in
most circumstances" similar to those presented in Asahi he would
find that a "purposeful availment" test for minimum contacts was
satisfied. 13 2
Accordingly, although resolving the case before it, the Supreme
Court in Asahi provided no definitive answers concerning the difficult
issues posed by the stream of commerce doctrine of personal juris-
diction. In the following sections of this article, those issues will be
considered.
III. DOMESTIC STREAM OF COMMERCE JURISDICTION AFTER ASAHI
With five justices rejecting Justice O'Connor's application of a
strict "purposeful availment" test in Asahi, the Court apparently is
prepared to endorse a fairly liberal stream of commerce doctrine of
127. Id. at 1037 (Brennan, J., concurring, in part, and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 306-07 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
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personal jurisdiction. 33 Moreover, even the four justices adopting a
strict purposeful availment test for minimum contacts would find
that test satisfied by "[additional conduct of the defendant" other
than mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce. 3 4
As examples of such constitutionally sufficient purposeful availment,
Justice O'Connor listed "designing the product for the market in the
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve
as the sales agent in the forum State."'3 5 In addition to providing
guidance for such specific factual situations, the opinions in Asahi
also are suggestive of the potential scope of any future development
of stream of commerce jurisdiction.
In this section of the article, such potential future development
of stream of commerce jurisdiction will be analyzed. Initially, this
section will consider the significance of direct versus indirect place-
ment of a product into the stream of commerce, sale versus use of
the product in the forum, the amenability to suit of both distributors
and manufacturers, and claims predicated upon the manufacture and
133. In his separate concurrence, in which Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined, Justice Brennan adopted a mere awareness standard for minimum
contacts: "As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product
is being marketed in the forum State, [the minimum contacts test should be
considered to be satisfied]." Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring, in
part, and concurring in the judgment). In his separate concurrence, in which Justices
White and Blackmun joined, Justice Stevens argued that any "purposeful availment"
test had been "misapplie[dJ" and that "[in most circumstances" conduct such as
Asahi's should be held to constitute purposeful availment satisfying the minimum
contacts test. Id. at 1038 -(Stevens, J., concurring, in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
In addition to the above disagreement with a strict purposeful availment test,
Justice Powell, one of the three justices who concurred with Justice O'Connor,
subsequently resigned from the Supreme Court.
134. Id. at 1033.
135. Id. Before Asahi, the state and lower federal courts had premised findings
of minimum contacts upon just such "[a]dditional conduct of the defendant" as
hypothesized by the Supreme Court. E.g., Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150
(6th Cir. 1982) (allegedly defective pliers delivered in United States mounted on
cards identifying them as having been manufactured in Korea for United States
retailer); Poyner v. Erma Werke, GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980) (German firearms manufacturer promoted its products in the
United States through a national distributor that, inter alia, conducted nationwide
advertising on manufacturer's behalf); Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indust., 452 F.
Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (Japanese motorcycle manufacturer sold motorcycles to
exclusive United States sales agent with knowledge that motorcycles would be brought
to forum state and sold through fifty-five retail dealers); Volkswagenwerk, A. G.
v. Klippan, GMBH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980)
(German seat belt manufacturer specifically designed allegedly defective seat belt to
comply with United States safety standards).
[Vol. 55
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distribution of component parts. After this analysis, the stream of
commerce minimum contacts test suggested by Justice Stevens in his
short concurrence in Asahi will be considered as a possible means of
analyzing stream of commerce jurisdictional issues. 3 6
A. Specific Variants of Domestic Stream of Commerce
Jurisdiction
Among the questions left unanswered by Asahi is whether per-
sonal jurisdiction can be predicated upon a stream of commerce
theory in various factual settings. Some of the major factual variants,
and stream of commerce requirements, now will be considered.
1. Directness of Contacts, Purposeful Availment, and Knowledge
Although endorsing a restrictive view of personal jurisdiction,
Justice O'Connor's Asahi opinion quoted language from World- Wide
Volkswagen indicating that even manufacturers and distributors who
indirectly place produds in the forum state can be subject to the
jurisdiction of that forum: "If the sale of a product . . . arises from
the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or
indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States ... "37
136. For more than two decades, commentators have criticized the defendant
bias inherent in the minimum contacts test. Weintraub, supra note 5; Lilly, supra
note 5; McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis,
35 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1982); Jay, supra note 33; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 6. In his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan also questioned
the "defendant focus" of the minimum contacts test and asserted that, because of
the subsequent "nationalization of commerce and the ease of transportation and
communication . . . [tihe model of society on which the International Shoe Court
based its opinion is no longer accurate." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 308,
309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Despite such criticism, the Supreme Court does not appear poised to repudiate
the requirement of minimum forum contacts as a prerequisite for personal jurisdic-
tion. "[Tlhe constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully
established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzew-
icz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
Accordingly, the analysis in this article presumes a continued adherence to a
minimum contacts requirement.
137. 107 S. Ct. at 1032 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297
(emphasis added)). Before its decision in International Shoe, the Supreme Court had
adopted a "corporate separateness" test under which a foreign corporation would
not be held to be doing business within a forum by reason of the activities of a
fully owned domestic subsidiary. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333 (1925). See generally, Note, Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations Based
on the Activities of their Subsidiaries in the Forum: Whither the Doctrine of
Corporate Separateness? 9 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 540 (1986); Brilmayer & Paisley,
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Indeed, the stream of commerce doctrine is to cover exactly those
situations in which a product has not been manufactured, sold, and
used within the forum state, but has been carried to the forum by
"the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to
distribution to retail sale."' 3
While accepting the possibility of personal jurisdiction premised
upon indirect forum contacts, Justice O'Connor proposed to restrict
stream of commerce jurisdiction by requiring "an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State" rather than
a mere "awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep
the product into the forum State. . . .. "9 However, as Justice Bren-
Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies,
and Agency, 74 CAUn. L. REv. 1 (1986).
At least some courts have continued to apply this doctrine and therefore have
refused to uphold state long arm jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based upon
the presence of a domestic subsidiary. Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d
1154, 1158-61 (5th Cir. 1983); Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381, 389-92
(D.N.M. 1984). Other courts, however, have suggested that "[i]n light of Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny, reliance on the rule of Cannon and on alter ego
principles of corporation law to determine a nonresident's 'presence' is no longer
relevant to the constitutional inquiry into whether an exercise of jurisdiction offends
traditional notions of fair play." Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F.
Supp. 1412, 1419 (E.D. Wis. 1983). See also Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F.
Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Energy Reserves Group v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F.
Supp. 483, 495-512 (D. Kan. 1978). Cf. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesells-
chaft, 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 503 N.E.2d 1045 (1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226
(1987) (wholly owned United States subsidiary is an agent of West German corpo-
ration for purposes of service of process and personal jurisdiction).
This latter view is more consistent with the modem view of due process, so
long as it is remembered that "jurisdiction over a parent corporation [does not]
automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary, . . . but each
defendant's contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually." Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984).
138. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1035 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring, in part, and concurring in the judgment). Nor would it
make sense to distinguish manufacturers that directly sell products within the forum
state from those that merely place their products into the stream of commerce
knowing that the products will reach the forum through the efforts of an intermediate
manufacturer, dealer, or distributor. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this fact
over twenty-five years ago in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.:
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the grow-
ing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a manufacturer
deals directly with consumers in other States. The fact that the benefit he
derives from its laws is an indirect one, however, does not make it any the
less essential to the conduct of his business; and it is not unreasonable,
where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in his product, to say
that the use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is
sufficient contact with this State to justify a requirement that he defend
here.
Gray, 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961). See also von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 6, at 1147.
139. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (italics omitted).
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nan suggested in his Asahi concurrence, Justice O'Connor's proposed
"purposeful direction" test appears to be a more restrictive interpre-
tation of stream of commerce jurisdiction than that endorsed in
World- Wide Volkswagen.' 4°
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court specifically noted that
"[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." '' 4' It
is difficult to reconcile this language predicating personal jurisdiction
upon a defendant's "expectation" of forum purchases with Justice
O'Connor's disclaimer in Asahi that "a defendant's awareness that
the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the
forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum
State.' 1142
Not only is the language of World- Wide Volkswagen inconsistent
with that of the O'Connor opinion, but that opinion is not consistent
with the rationale of the earlier decision. The World- Wide Volkswa-
gen majority explained the rationale for the purposeful availment
test as follows:
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State," . . . it has clear
notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the
risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the
expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great,
severing its connection with the State. 43
The notice, rationale for the purposeful availment test thus is
satisfied so long as the defendant is aware of the possibility of suit
in the foreign forum. Even more significantly, the mere awareness
that a product will reach the forum will permit a defendant to take
the necessary precautionary measures to preclude, or at least lessen,
the risk of litigation in the foreign forum.'" There is thus little or
140. Id. at 1036-37 (Brennan, J., concurring, in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
141. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
142. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
143. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (citation omitted) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
144. In addition to structuring its business dealings to lessen the likelihood
that its products will enter specific fora, modern corporations generally will obtain
insurance or decide on a policy of self-insurance. Professor Weintraub therefore has
argued that "[i]t makes no sense ... to wax eloquent about unfairness to a localized
defendant who will be defended and indemnified by an insurer that often engages
in litigation in the forum." Weintraub, supra note 5, at 526. See also World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 303-304, 305 n.9; Lilly, supra note 5, at 108. Professor
19871
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no functional rationale for restricting stream of commerce jurisdiction
to those defendants who have undertaken "[a]dditional conduct"
beyond awareness of potential forum contacts.
Because there is no functional justification for a requirement of
"[a]dditional conduct" beyond awareness, any such requirement must
be based upon an assumption that the fairness of the forum (which
the due process clause is to insure) is somehow dependent upon the
special nature of affirmative intentional actions.' 45 However, it is not
immediately apparent why a distinction should be made between a
defendant that intentionally insures that its products will be sold in
the forum and a defendant that sells or distributes its products with
the knowledge that the actions of others will result in forum sales. 146
To the extent that the value of a product is enhanced by its eventual
distribution in the forum, both defendants will receive comparable
benefits and protections from the forum and therefore should be
treated comparably. 147
In addition, to include the defendant's intent as an element of
personal jurisdiction will further complicate an already complex
Brilmayer, however, has noted that "[pilaintiffs as well as defendants may have
insurance" which will moderate the burdens of litigating in a distant forum.
Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 111.
145. Justice O'Connor noted in her Asahi opinion that "[a]dditional conduct
of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
State .... ." Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
146. As Professor Lilly has observed, "[T]he contact [required by constitu-
tional due process] should not inevitably be confined to the deliberate, affirmative
activity mandated by the Court in Volkswagen. It ought to suffice for purposes of
determining adjudicatory power that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen
the development of an affiliating link with the forum state." Lilly, supra note 5,
at 114-15.
The Second Restatement of Conflicts also recognizes that there will be situations
in which a state constitutionally can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
who has committed an act "not done with the intention of causing effects in the
state, [but which] could reasonably have been expected to do so." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 comment a, at 157-58 (1971). But see 1986
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 comment
e, at 74 (1986) ("[Wihen the defendant did not intend to cause the particular effect
in the state . .. [t]he fact that the effect in the state was foreseeable will not, of
itself, suffice to give the state judicial jurisdiction over the action.").
For scholarly commentary supporting and opposing an intent or causation
requirement for personal jurisdiction compare Weisburd, supra note 5, at 405-06
(opposing such a requirement) with Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 94-96 (supporting
such a requirement).
147. In fact, the Supreme Court's original focus on "purposeful availment"
in Hanson v. Denckla was due to the benefits and protections such purposeful
availment would engender. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("[Ilt is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws."). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475-76 (1985).
HeinOnline  -- 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 68 1987-1988
1987] PERSONAL JURISDICTION
determination. "'Intent' is . . . one of the most often misunderstood
legal concepts. The distinction between intentional and unintentional
[actions] draws a bright line of separation among shadings of almost
infinitely varied human experiences.' 14s Thus the difficulty in apply-
ing an intent test is another reason to reject such an additional stream
of commerce requirement. 149
Accordingly, the fact that a defendant has not engaged in
"[additional conduct" beyond mere awareness that its products will
reach the forum state in the stream of commerce should not, by
itself, preclude the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 50
2. Sale Versus Use of Product in Forum State
One of the obvious factual differences between Asahi and World-
Wide Volkswagen is that the allegedly defective product was sold in
the forum state in Asahi, while the automobile at issue in World-
Wide Volkswagen was not."' World-Wide Volkswagen's qualified
endorsement of stream of commerce jurisdiction thus was that "[tihe
148. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
TiE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 33 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
149. For similar practical reasons, Professor Lewis has suggested that aware-
ness or expectation of suit be determined by an objective, rather than a subjective,
test:
As in the criminal law, it would often be impossible for courts to
ascertain defendants' actual subjective expectations about place of suit.
Evidence of actual subjective expectations is seldom available. Moreover,
many defendants do not expect that their conduct will give rise to litigation
anywhere ....
Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform
Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984). Dean Peter Hay recently has suggested
that "[riather than basing jurisdiction on the defendant's 'awareness' of the [forum]
market, it would be better to put it in terms that the [forum] was a 'reasonably
anticipated market."' Hay, supra note 5, at 37 n.35.
Even if an objective test is applied, however, there will remain difficult determina-
tions concerning defendants' expectations and awareness. Compare Giotis v. Apollo
of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1303
(1987) (fireworks manufacturer and distributor held subject to personal jurisdiction
of Wisconsin courts, even though fireworks were purchased in Minnesota by Min-
nesota resident; defendants neither sold nor distributed fireworks in Wisconsin, and
fireworks were illegal in Wisconsin), with People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48
Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957) (mortgagee was not subject to forfeiture of
automobile lien in California, because car was transported to California in violation
of express contractual prohibition against removing car from Texas).
150. However, in order for the minimum contacts test to be satisfied, the
volume and value of the defendant's products reaching the forum in the stream of
commerce still must be constitutionally sufficient. See notes 176-92 infra and
accompanying text.
151. Indeed, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court stressed throughout its opin-
ion that the automobile had been sold in New York rather than in the forum state
of Oklahoma. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287, 288, 295, 298.
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forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.' 15 2
It is unclear whether this focus on forum sales was meant to
constitute a per se rule requiring such sales as a prerequisite for
stream of commerce jurisdiction. Federal appellate decisions subse-
quent to World- Wide Volkswagen differed concerning the significance
of mere use, without sale, within the forum.' Justice Brennan has
suggested that "the decision in World-Wide Volkswagen [did not]
establish a per se rule against the exercise of jurisdiction where the
contacts arise from a consumer's use of the product in a given State,
but only a rule against jurisdiction in cases involving 'one, isolated
occurrence [of consumer use, amounting to] . . . the fortuitous
circumstance . ".'.. 1154
Regardless of the justices' intent in World-Wide Volkswagen, a
per se jurisdictional rule requiring forum sales has little to recommend
it other than the certainty that such a bright line test would provide.
"It is difficult to see why the Constitution should distinguish between
a case involving goods which reach a distant State through a chain
of distribution and a case involving goods which reach the same
State because a consumer, using them as the dealer knew the customer
would, took them there.' 1 5  In both cases the seller presumably has
received "benefits and protections of [the forum state's] laws."' 15 6
Moreover, not only do many major metropolitan areas today extend
across state lines, but "it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial
life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail
and wire communications across state lines.' 1 7
152. Id. at 297-98 (emphasis added). However, the authority cited in support
of this dictum was Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which the allegedly defective valve (although not
the hot water heater into which it was incorporated) was sold outside the forum
state.
153. Compare Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983),
modified, in part, on other grounds, 733 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1984) (personal
jurisdiction upheld), with DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981) (personal jurisdiction unconstitutional).
154. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. at 1037 n.3
(Brennan, J., concurring, in part, and concurring in the judgment) (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
155. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
157. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Indicative of
the prevalence of purchases from out-of-state vendors, "[aill [forty-five] States [and
the District of Columbia] that impose sales taxes also impose a corollary use tax on
tangible property bought out of State." National Geographic Soc. v. California Bd.
of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 & n.4 (1977).
[Vol. 55
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Neither considerations of practicality nor fairness necessitate im-
munizing from suit defendants whose products are used, but not
sold, within the forum state. To require forum sales as a per se
jurisdictional prerequisite would be to afford a significantly greater
legal significance to state boundaries than such boundaries possess
in modern commercial practice. 15 8
Rather than employ a per se rule precluding stream of commerce
jurisdiction predicated upon mere use of a product in the forum, the
focus should be upon "the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor
to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its products in other
States ... .'159 The isolated use of a single product within the
forum, such as theautomobile in World-Wide Volkswagen, thus may
not be sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test. Nevertheless,
the nature of the contact with the forum (i.e., use, rather than sale,
of the product) should not be determinative. Therefore, in appro-
priate circumstances, either use or sale of a product within the forum
may provide a constitutionally sufficient predicate for stream of
commerce jurisdiction.
3. Defendant Distributor Versus Manufacturer
In addition to the distinction concerning forum sales, another
major factual difference between Asahi and World- Wide Volkswagen
is that the defendants challenging jurisdiction in World-Wide Volks-
wagen were retail and wholesale distributors while the third-party
defendant in Asahi was a manufacturer.160 However, the World- Wide
Volkswagen stream of commerce dictum recognized the possibility
of personal jurisdiction premised upon "the efforts of [a) manufac-
turer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its
products in other States."'' 61 Moreover, lower court decisions subse-
quent to World-Wide Volkswagen upheld the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over distributors under the stream of commerce doc-
trine. 62
158. As Professor Jay has noted, "[Tihe modern large-scale commercial en-
terprise hardly considers state lines relevant. Profits are made because products cross
boundaries to reach a large number of consumers; regardless of whether the dealer
makes direct contact with a distant state, the business benefits from the broad
dispersal which occurs." Jay, supra note 33, at 446.
159. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
160. Although both the manufacturer and national importer of the allegedly
defective automobile were defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen, neither of them
challenged personal jurisdiction in the Oklahoma or United States Supreme Courts.
Id. at 288 n.3.
161. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
162. E.g., Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1303 (1987); Nelson ex rel. Carson v. Park Indus., Inc.,
717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984); Stabilisierungsfonds
Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19871
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While there may be some superficial appeal to distinguishing
between jurisdictional assertions involving manufacturers and distrib-
utors, there is no principled basis upon which to make such a
distinction. To the extent that a distributor "serve[s], directly or
indirectly, the market for its products in other States,"'' 63 it, too,
should be subject to personal jurisdiction in those states.
This is not to say, however, that all, or any, distributors in a
particular distribution chain will be subject to suit in all fora. As
one federal appellate court has recognized, "[A] manufacturer or
primary distributor may be subject to a particular forum's jurisdiction
when a secondary distributor and retailer are not, because the man-
ufacturer and primary distributor have intended to serve a broader
market and they derive direct benefits from serving that market." 164
Moreover, due to the nature of products liability actions, it may be
more difficult, as a matter of substantive tort law, to successfully
assert such claims against distributors than against manufacturers.' 61
Nevertheless, in situations in which minimum contacts exist be-
tween a distributor and the forum, that distributor should be subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. As with attempts to
distinguish between sale and use of a product in the forum, no per
se rule mechanically excluding distributors from suit under the stream
of commerce doctrine should be adopted.
4. Component Parts Manufacturers
Just as distributors should be subject to stream of commerce
jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances, component parts manufac-
turers also should be held subject to suit when they have minimum
contacts with the forum. Thus, even Justice O'Connor's Asahi opin-
ion did not rely upon Asahi's status as a component parts manufac-
turer as support for the conclusion that stream of commerce personal
jurisdiction could not be asserted. '66 Indeed, the seminal state stream
of commerce decision, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard San-
163. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
164. Nelson, 717 F.2d at 1125-26.
165. For example, although the plaintiffs' claim in World-Wide Volkswagen
concerned the allegedly defective design and placement of their car's gas tank and
fuel system, this claim was asserted against the car's manufacturer, importer,
wholesale distributor, and retail dealer. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
In addition, Professor Brilmayer has proposed that, for the purposes of specific
jurisdiction, the only contacts with a forum that should be considered constitutionally
significant are those related to the underlying substantive claim. Brilmayer, supra
note 20, at 82. Thus, "[i]n World-Wide Volkswagen, the defendant's affiliation with
other dealers doing business in Oklahoma was not a related contact since there was
no reason to allege that fact other than to manufacture a jurisdictional contention."
Id. at 88.
166. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1031-33.
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itary Corp. ,167 involved a claim brought against a component parts
manufacturer. In addition, both state and federal decisions subse-
quent to World-Wide Volkswagen upheld personal jurisdiction over
foreign and foreign country component parts manufacturers.'
61
Not all courts, however, have sustained the extension of long
arm jurisdiction over component parts manufacturers. 69 Both courts
and commentators have argued that
[ajlthough the states may have a legitimate interest in protecting
... residents from defective product injuries, that interest is ade-
quately protected by allowing actions against the immediate seller
or manufacturer-assembler .... Tort law has sufficiently advanced
such that the state's interests in protecting its residents from defec-
tive products is fully served without the need for drawing into the
litigation all of the remote parts manufacturers from around the
world. 1 70
However, to the extent that there is any perceived unfairness in
subjecting a component parts manufacturer to suit, the unfairness is
inherent in the substantive law of tort.' 7' Any efforts to protect
component parts manufacturers from suit should focus on substantive
tort law, rather than attempt to indirectly undercut the policies
advanced by such law through special jurisdictional rules and excep-
tions.
In Calder v. Jones,172 the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the
argument that claims against remote defendants should not be enter-
tained if other, solvent defendants who can satisfy plaintiff's claims
are amenable to suit. The trial court in that case had quashed service
of process directed to the reporter and editor of an allegedly libelous
article, noting, inter alia, that plaintiff's rights could be "fully
satisfied" by her claim against the defendant publisher. I'7  The Su-
167. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
168. E.g., Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th
Cir. 1984); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 553
F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982); State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale,
294 Or. 381, 657 P.2d 211 (1982); Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GMBH, 611
P.2d 498 (Alaska), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980).
169. E.g., Shaw v. American Cyanamid Co., 534 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn.
1982); Phoenix Trimming, Inc. v. Mowday, 431 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
petition denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983); Martinez v. American Standard, 91
A.D. 652, 457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 873, 458 N.E.2d 826, 470
N.Y.S.2d 367 (1983).
170. Kennedy, supra note 99, at 338. See Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d
833, 837 n.1 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); Samuels v. BMW of N.
America, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
171. Component parts manufacturers can be subject to tort claims in either
negligence or strict liability. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 148, at § 100.
172. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
173. Calder, 465 U.S. at 786.
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preme Court, however, ultimately upheld the constitutionality of
service upon the employees, because they were "primary participants
in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a [forum] resi-
dent. 17 4
Similarly, component parts manufacturers should not be insulated
from suit merely because they have not directly dealt with the forum.
While a component parts manufacturer may not be able to take
direct advantage of a marketplace, the commercial usefulness and
value of component parts are premised upon the incorporation of
those components into finished products that then will be distributed
in the marketplace.
When minimum contacts, direct or indirect, exist with the forum
and personal jurisdiction would not be unfair or unreasonable,
component parts manufacturers, too, should be subject to suit. As
with the distinctions between forum sales and use, distributors and
manufacturers, and direct and indirect forum contact, no per se rules
should be adopted immunizing certain classes of defendants from
suit. Instead, the constitutional sufficiency of a defendant's forum
contacts should be tested by a general test such as the one discussed
in the next section of this article.175
B. Justice Stevens' Concurrence as a Test for Minimum
Contacts
Because of the four/four/one split within the Supreme Court
concerning the stream of commerce doctrine, Justice Stevens' short
174. Id. at 790.
175. A possible criticism of a minimum contacts test that does not employ
per se rules is that such a test does not provide either state and lower federal courts
or private actors with any certainty as to what conduct constitutes constitutionally
sufficient minimum contacts. As Justice White asserted in arguing that the Supreme
Court should accept a personal jurisdiction case involving contractual dealings
between corporate parties, "The disarray among federal and state courts . . . may
well have a disruptive effect on commercial relations in which certainty of result is
a prime objective." Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co.,
445 U.S. 907, 911 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Similarly, an Advisor to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws also
recently has suggested that "[tihe underlying reason for the continuing uncertainty
as to personal jurisdiction seems to be the inability of the courts to effect any
special rules; the only guidance is the indefinite concept of minimum contacts."
Packel, Congressional Power to Reduce Personal Jurisdiction Litigation, 59 TEMPLE
L.Q. 919, 919-20 (1986). See also Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State
Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 156 (1982).
However, the Supreme Court has answered the criticism that its test for personal
jurisdiction is too indefinite:
This approach does, of course, preclude clear-cut jurisdictional rules. But
any inquiry into "fair play and substantial justice" necessarily requires
determinations "in which few answers will be written in 'black and white.
The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable."'
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 486 n.29 (1985) (quoting Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545
(1948))).
HeinOnline  -- 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 74 1987-1988
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
concurrence in Asahi may represent the limits to which the present
Court is prepared to go in accepting stream of commerce jurisdiction.
Moreover, Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices White and
Blackmun, and therefore may be the type of analysis that the Court
will employ in the future to test assertions of stream of commerce
jurisdiction. For these reasons, this opinion now will be analyzed.
Without explicitly adopting Justice O'Connor's "purposeful avail-
ment" test, Justice Stevens asserted that such a test had been mis-
applied in Asahi.'76 Although not describing in detail the test that he
would apply, Justice Stevens argued that "purposeful availment"
(and, thus, minimum contacts) "requires a constitutional determi-
nation that is affected by the volume, the value, and the hazardous
character of the components [placed into the stream of com-
merce].' 7 7 Justice Stevens, therefore, apparently has suggested that
while "mere awareness" by a manufacturer that its products will
enter the forum state is not sufficient to establish minimum contacts
in all cases, in cases such as Asahi the minimum contacts test may
be satisfied. 178
Indeed, rather than becoming entangled in distinctions between
"mere awareness" and "purposeful availment," Justice Stevens sug-
gests that the Court instead focus on the goods that actually have
reached the forum in the stream of commerce.
Justice Stevens' focus on "the volume, the value, and the haz-
ardous character of the components' '1 79 also is quite consistent with
the consideration in International Shoe of "the quality and nature
of [defendant's] activity in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-
tration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure."' 80 Accordingly, Justice Stevens' suggestion not to
focus directly on the purposeful nature of defendant's conduct, but
to instead determine the actual degree to which a defendant has
"serve[d] ... the market,"'"' is both a reasonable and workable
method by which to determine minimum contacts.
Not only the general approach suggested by Justice Stevens, but
two of the three factors he has included in his proposed test, are
quite properly considered in analyzing minimum-forum contacts. The
extent to which a defendant has "serve[d] ...the [forum] market,"' 8 2
176. 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring, in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
177. Id.
178. Id. It is important to remember that Justice Stevens' proposed test is
merely to determine the existence of minimum contacts. Even if this test were
satisfied and minimum contacts found to exist, personal jurisdiction would be
unconstitutional if found to be "unreasonable and unfair." Id.
179. Id.
180. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
181. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, quoted in Asahi, 107 S. Ct.
at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring, in part, and concurring in the judgment).
182. Id.
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and thus obtained the benefits and protections of the forum, can
best be determined by the value and volume of that defendant's
products distributed within the forum. Moreover, by focusing on the
actual commercial relationship between the defendant and the forum,
a forum sale that is merely "an isolated occurrence" will not subject
foreign manufacturers and distributors to the jurisdiction of the
forum. 183
Although not explicitly stated by Justice Stevens, the volume and
value of products within the forum must be considered together in
determining constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts. Thus, while
it may take millions of inexpensive cigarette lighters 8 4 or thousands
of steel castings'85 to establish minimum forum contacts, the sale of
even a single product within the forum may satisfy minimum contacts
if the product is sufficiently valuable. 8 6 Or, to take an example from
Asahi, the sale of thousands of motorcycle tire tubes in California
may provide sufficient contacts to assert personal jurisdiction over
the tube manufacturer Cheng Shin, but not over Asahi, the manu-
facturer of the less expensive valve subassembly.
Although Justice Stevens' focus on the volume and value of
products within the forum provides a helpful test for minimum
contacts, his suggestion that "the hazardous character of the com-
ponents" also be considered is problematic.187 In fact, consideration
of the hazardous character of the component part for jurisdictional
purposes creates the very type of "double counting" disapproved by
the Supreme Court in the first amendment context.'
183. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
184. Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
185. Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp, 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.
1984).
186. See Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
See also Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Cf. Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) ("So long as it creates a
'substantial connection' with the forum, even a single act can support jurisdiction.").
187. Justice Stevens' consideration of the hazardous character of the compo-
nent part is similar to the dissenters' suggestion in World-Wide Volkswagen that "a
critical factor in the disposition of the litigation is the nature of the instrumentality
under consideration." 444 U.S. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at
306 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 314, 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting). While these
justices' concern was with the mobility of the allegedly defective automobile, at
least one federal appellate court has relied upon the hazardous character of an
allegedly defective product in upholding jurisdiction. Poyner v. Erma Werke, GMBH,
618 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (personal jurisdiction
upheld over German firearms manufacturer).
188. In Calder v. Jones the Court addressed this issue as follows:
We ... reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter
into the jurisdictional analysis .... [Tihe potential chill on protected First
Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation actions is already
taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the substantive law
governing such suits. To reintroduce those concerns at the jurisdictional
[Vol. 55
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A similar form of "double counting" would exist were the
hazardous nature of a component part to form the predicate for
both the assertion of personal jurisdiction and the imposition of a
heightened standard of liability under substantive tort law. Under
the substantive law of torts, the potentially hazardous character of
manufactured components has been held to subject the manufacturer
not only to liability for negligence, but, in many situations, to strict
liability. 189 Moreover, the determination of whether a product is
hazardous or dangerously defective may pose difficult issues under
modem tort law, 19° and there is little reason to further complicate
personal jurisdiction analysis by importing tort rules into that anal-
ysis. For just such reasons, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
refused to craft separate jurisdictional rules based upon the hazardous
nature of the automobile: "The 'dangerous instrumentality' concept
apparently was never used to support personal jurisdiction; and to
the extent it has relevance today it bears not on jurisdiction but on
the possible desirability of imposing substantive principles of tort law
such as strict liability." 191
While the hazardous character of a product thus should not be
considered in the stream of commerce analysis, product value and
volume provide a workable test for minimum contacts. These two
factors should be more objectively ascertainable than are the inten-
tions or subjective purposes of a defendant. In addition, the test is
one that can be applied to the different persons (manufacturers and
distributors), activities (sale and use), and products (component parts
and finished products) within the distribution stream. Accordingly,
when a person is not only aware that his products have entered the
forum, but the value and volume of those products are such that
the person has "serve[d] . . . the [forum] market," 1 92 the minimum
contacts test should be considered satisfied.
IV. THE STREAM OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO FOREIGN
COUNTRY DEFENDANTS
While the previous section of this article considered the stream
of commerce doctrine in a domestic setting, this section considers
stage would be a form of double counting.
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (citations omitted). See also Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.12 (1984); Army Times Publishing Co.
v. Watts, 730 F.2d 1398, 1400-1401 (lth Cir. 1984).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 394 ("Chattel Known to be Danger-
ous"); § 395 ("Negligent Manufacture of Chattel Dangerous Unless Carefully
Made"); § 402A ("Special Liability to Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer") (1965). See also Bieman, Strict Products Liability: An Overview of
State Law, 10 J. PROD. LIAB. 111 (1987).
190. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 148, at § 99 ("Meaning of Dangerously
Defective or Unsafe Products").
191. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 n.ll.
192. Id. at 297.
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whether there should be any separate standard for applying that
doctrine to adjudicate claims brought against foreign country defen-
dants. 93 There are substantial policy arguments for the requirement
of either greater, or lesser, forum contacts when the defendant is
from a foreign country.' 94 The conclusion reached, however, is that
the international character of litigation should not necessitate any
different showing of minimum contacts, but should be considered as
one of several factors in the determination of whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction would offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."1 95
The Asahi Court was sensitive to the foreign country status of
Asahi and the international implications of the assertion of personal
jurisdiction by the California courts:
In every case . . . [the interests of other nations], as well as the
Federal interest in its foreign relations policies, will be best served
by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the
serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State. "Great
care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of
personal jurisdiction into the international field.",96
193. Although "[t]here are significant differences between interstate and in-
ternational cases," "[b]y and large, American courts and writers have not distin-
guished between international and interstate conflicts for choice-of-law purposes."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10, comment d and reporter's note,
at 39 (1971). See also Note, The Outer Limits of In Personam Jurisdiction Over
Alien Corporations: The National Contacts Theory, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 637 (1982); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 6, at 1122. But see Du
Bois, The Significance in Conflict Laws of the Distinction Between Interstate and
International Transactions, 17 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1933); Ehrenzweig, Interstate
and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REv. 717
(1957).
194. See notes 196-222 infra and accompanying text.
195. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
196. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank,
379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). As one commentator has noted,
"[T]he difficulty of enforcing a judgment obtained against an alien defendant, the
fear of retaliation by courts abroad against American citizens, and the constraints
of international law all counsel restraint in claiming jurisdiction over aliens." Note,
Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional
Standard, 95 HARv. L. REv. 470, 483 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, concern by foreign manufacturers was evidenced by the amicus curiae
briefs filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of Asahi. Such briefs were filed by the
American Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom and the Confederation of
British Industry, Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S. A. (a Brazilian aluminum manufac-
turer subject to suit in United States courts concerning allegedly malfunctioning
cookers), and Cassiar Mining Corporation (a Canadian company that mines raw
asbestos fiber and which has been sued in the United States for injuries allegedly
stemming from construction materials fabricated from the fibers).
[Vol. 55
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Not only must "great care" be taken in asserting jurisdiction to
insure a proper respect for foreign sovereignties, but interests of the
United States, too, can be undermined by overly expansive jurisdic-
tional assertions. The Supreme Court was sensitive to this fact in
upholding a forum-selection clause requiring the litigation of a com-
mercial dispute in London, rather than in the United States, in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our law
and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts. 97
Moreover, even once a plaintiff has obtained a judgment in a
United States court, he or she often will be required to seek enforce-
ment of that judgment in a foreign jurisdiction. 198 "The jurisdictional
tests that are acceptable to United States courts may be viewed as
exorbitant in an international context .... When jurisdiction has
been based on principles that are considered exorbitant by other
nations, the likelihood of recognition, enforcement, and recovery is
limited."' 99 Thus, if a foreign country does not recognize the validity
of a United States judgment, having obtained jurisdiction over the
197. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). See also Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.l I (1974) ("To determine that 'American
standards of fairness' . . . must [automatically] govern the controversy demeans the
standards of justice elsewhere in the world and unnecessarily exalts the primacy of
United States law over the laws of other countries.").
As was noted over twenty years ago:
[I]n establishing bases for jurisdiction in the international sense, a legal
system cannot confine its analysis solely to its own ideas of what is just,
appropriate, and convenient. To a degree it must take into account the
views of other communities concerned. Conduct that is overly self-regarding
with respect to the taking and exercise of jurisdiction can disturb the
international order and produce political, legal, and economic reprisals.
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 6, at 1127. See also Born, Reflections on
Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1987).
198. Professors James and Hazard have explained:
There are at least two critical aspects of enforcement of a judgment. The
first is establishing authority to pronounce judgment, in particular estab-
lishing authority that will be recognized elsewhere if the judgment cannot
be enforced within the jurisdiction where it was rendered. This is the
problem of recognition of judgments. The second critical aspect of enforce-
ment is being able to exercise effective coercion to get compliance with the
judgment if the judgment loser refuses to comply voluntarily with the
judgment.
F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, Crv PROCEDURE § 2.32, at 110 (3d ed. 1985).
199. Note, supra note 137, at 587, 589. See also Weintraub, Jurisdiction Over
the Foreign Non-Sovereign Defendant, 19 SAN DEGo L. REv. 431, 436 (1982).
1987]
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foreign country defendant may be of little practical significance. 20
Despite the above reasons cautioning "great care and reserve
' 20 1
in the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign country defendants, the
nationality of the defendant should not be given determinative weight
in the personal jurisdiction calculus. 20 2 It should not be assumed that
plaintiffs routinely or frivolously will attempt to obtain jurisdiction
over foreign country defendants. Indeed, in the Asahi litigation not
only Cheng Shin, but another co-defendant, filed a claim against
Asahi. However, service of process was never perfected by Cheng
Shin's co-defendant because of the $5000.00 cost for translation and
other expenses associated with service of a Japanese defendant under
applicable procedural requirements. 203 The burdens and complexities
200. One commentator has argued that the absence of an international equiv-
alent to the full faith and credit clause is a reason to require more substantial forum
contacts when asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign country defendant.
When international parties are involved, "Full Faith and Credit" is inap-
plicable for enforcement and the plaintiff must rely on principles of
international comity. Consequently, it is arguable that when international
defendants are involved, courts should return to the traditional doctrines
of jurisdiction between independent sovereigns and find jurisdiction only
where the forum has a more traditional "power" to support jurisdiction
over the defendant.
Note, International Products Liability and Long-Arm Jurisdiction: Hutson v. Fehr
Bros., 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 319, 322 (1980).
However, another legal scholar recently has asserted that "[ilt is unclear how
frequently foreign recognition of judgments is necessary, even in international cases"
and that "[a] United States plaintiff's decision that he will not need to enforce a
United States judgment against a foreign defendant, or if so, that he will be
successful in doing so, would probably be fairly accurate in many cases." Born,
supra note 197, at 23 & n.101.
201. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan,
J., dissenting), quoted in Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035.
202. Indeed, both commentators and courts have suggested that, at least when
there is no alternative domestic forum available, United States courts should be
more ready to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign country defendants than over
domestic defendants. Bach v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 521, 527 (D.
Ariz. 1979); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp.
659, 664 (D.N.H. 1977); LeManufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v.
District Court, 620 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Colo. 1980); Toran, Federalism, Personal
Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TUL. L. REv. 758 (1984); Weinberg, The Helicopter
Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913 (1985).
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court raised, without deciding, the question
of whether a more expansive personal jurisdiction may be exercised where there is
no alternative forum available. 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977). Subsequently the
Court refused to adopt a doctrine of "jurisdiction by necessity" in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984). In Helicopteros
the Court struck down the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign country
defendant by a Texas state court, even though the potential alternative forum was
in Colombia or Peru rather than in the United States. Id.
203. Stewart, Shortening California's Long Arm, 73 A.B.A. J. 45, 46 (April
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of such international service of process should not be underestimated:
Lawyers in the United States accustomed to the relative ease of
service of process in federal court litigation frequently are surprised
to find that compliance with the technical requirements of service
outside the United States can involve costs, delays and technical
pitfalls grossly disproportionate to the basic function of service of
process, that of notifying the defendant of the pending action. ' ' 204
In concluding that the California courts could not constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over Asahi, the Supreme Court relied, in part,
upon the "unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system. ' 20 5 However, comparable burdens are
placed upon a United States plaintiff who initiates suit in a foreign
jurisdiction. 2°6 Among the burdens and expenses of litigating in a
foreign country are the cost of a foreign country filing fee, 20 and
the need to employ foreign, as well as United States, counsel. 20 8 In
1, 1987). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i), for alternative means of service upon
parties in foreign countries, and the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention),
Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 162. The specific
requirements for service of process on a Japanese defendant are set forth in Peterson,
Jurisdiction and the Japanese Defendant, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 555 (1985). See
also Horlick, A Practical Guide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14
INT'L LAW. 637 (1980).
204. Horlick, supra note 203, at 637. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 4(i), advisory
committee's note (1963) ("Service of process beyond the territorial limits of the
United States may involve difficulties not encountered in the case of domestic
service.").
205. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
206. Not only do the costs and burdens associated with foreign suit make a
domestic forum attractive to United States plaintiffs, but they also may induce
foreign country plaintiffs (such as Cheng Shin in the Asahi case) to bring suit in
the United States.
As the Supreme Court has noted, "American courts ... are ... extremely
attractive to foreign plaintiffs." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252
(1981). Among the reasons for the attractiveness of United States courts to foreign
country defendants are this country's acceptance of strict liability in tort, the potential
ability to choose among fifty different state jurisdictions in which to file suit, and
the availability of jury trials, contingent attorneys' fees, and broad discovery. Id.
at 252 n.18. However, because "a foreign plaintiff's choice [of forum] deserves less
deference" than that of a domestic plaintiff, id. at 256, claims brought by foreign
country plaintiffs may be particularly suitable for forum non conveniens dismissals.
See notes 234-43 infra and accompanying text. For a recent example of a forum
non conveniens dismissal of actions brought by foreign country plaintiffs in the
United States, see In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 199 (1987).
207. Japanese filing fees are based on a percentage of the plaintiff's claim,
and "the filing fee for a $1,000,000 claim would probably exceed $5000." Peterson,
supra note 203, at 582-83.
208. See, e.g., Finn, Foreign Lawyers: Regulation of Foreign Lawyers in
1987]
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addition, case backlogs and judicial delays may well be encountered
in foreign, as well as in United States, courts.209
Perhaps even more significantly, it is difficult to justify an across-
the-board rule under which a foreign country defendant, such as a
major, multi-national corporation, would only be subject to suit if
it had significantly greater contacts with the forum than the minimum
contacts required to entertain a claim against a domestic corporation.
For instance, it should be less burdensome for a Canadian corpo-
ration in Windsor, Ontario to appear in a Detroit court than for a
Hawaiian manufacturer to respond to an action in the civil code
courts of Louisiana. 210
Indeed, to the extent that amenability to suit has a substantial
substantive effect upon a foreign country corporate defendant, a
similar effect upon a domestic corporation should be presumed.21
Thus, one section of Cheng Shin's brief in the Supreme Court was
Japan, 28 HARv. INT'L L. J. 123 (1987) (describing the limited opportunities for
foreign lawyers in Japan, which prohibits non-Japanese lawyers from appearing in,
or preparing documents for, Japanese courts or administrative agencies). However,
a domestic defendant sued in a state other than its own also may need to retain
local counsel. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (per curiam). See also Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283-84 n.16 (1985).
209. Falt, Congestion and Delay in Asia's Courts, 4 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.
J. 90, 145 (1985) ("Studies thus far conducted substantiate the assertions of those
most directly involved in the administration of justice that most Asian court systems
are unable to keep pace with an ever increasing volume of litigation.").
210. Compare Olsen ex rel. Sheldon v. Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984) (California court can constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over Mexico in action concerning airplane crash near
United States/Mexican border) with Larson v. Association of Apartment Owners,
606 F. Supp. 579 (D. Minn. 1985) (Minnesota court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over Hawaiian defendants in suit concerning an injury sustained at
defendants' Hawaiian condominium). See also The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-
Leading Cases, 101 HtAv. L. REV. 119, 269, n.62 (1987) ("Distance and unfamiliarity
with the American legal system are not necessarily related.").
211. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, Justice O'Connor noted in her opinion
in Asahi:
We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal
court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of
national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and
the State in which the federal court sits.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct., 1026, 1033 (1987). See also
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Woolf & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 409 n.5 (1987).
For discussions of the "national contacts" theory of personal jurisdiction, see
Born, supra note 197, at 36-42; Lilly, supra note 5, at 127-49; Fullerton, Consti-
tutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1 (1984); Note, supra note 193, at 637; Note, National Contacts as a
Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction Over Aliens in Federal Question Suits, 70 CALIF.
L. REV. 686 (1982); Note, supra note 196.
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entitled "A Competitive Edge Must Not Be Given to Foreign Man-
ufacturers. "212
The Supreme Court recently evidenced a sensitivity to such con-
cerns by refusing to interpret the Hague Evidence Convention to
provide the exclusive means of obtaining discovery from a foreign
country defendant, when to do so would place domestic businesses
at a competitive disadvantage:
[A] rule of exclusivity would enable a company which is a citizen
of another contracting State to compete with a domestic company
on uneven terms, since the foreign company would be subject to
less extensive discovery procedures in the event that both companies
were sued in an American court. Petitioners made a voluntary
decision to market their products in the United States. They are
entitled to compete on equal terms with other companies operating
in this market. 213
Moreover, despite their constitutional powers in the areas of
foreign relations and international trade, 214 neither Congress nor the
Executive have acted to restrict judicial assertion of personal juris-
diction over foreign country defendants. This inaction is all the more
significant because Congress has enacted legislation governing suits
brought against foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities.
In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,215 Congress spe-
cifically provided for subject matter and personal jurisdiction, as well
as world-wide service of process, in cases brought against such foreign
defendants concerning, inter alia, certain torts and commercial activ-
ities.21 6
212. Brief for Respondent, at 27, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (No. 85-693). Cheng Shin (ironically, a foreign country
corporation, itself) argued:
American manufacturers must include in the cost of their goods the
expenses associated with potential liability under products liability legislation
and case law. Those domestic companies whose products are sold through-
out the United States are subject to lawsuits in virtually every state. If
foreign manufacturers of component parts are not subject to this same
jurisdictional liability, a significant competitive advantage will be obtained
over domestic manufacturers ..
Id.
213. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court,
107 S. Ct. 2542, 2553 n.25 (1987).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 1, cl. 1; art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art.
II, § 3. See generally L. HENKIN, FoREIGN AiFFAIRs AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
215. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602-1611 (1982)).
216. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), (a)(5), 1608 (1982). Not only does the Act apply
in both federal and state courts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604 (1982), but foreign states
can remove actions brought against them from state to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(d) (1982). Thus "Congress [has] deliberately sought to channel cases against
19871
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Congress' specific recognition of broad jurisdiction and service
of process in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "in the most
internationally sensitive area-suits against a sovereign, 2 1 7 should
reassure domestic courts otherwise hesitant to assert a reasoned
stream of commerce jurisdiction over foreign country defendants.
Moreover, the courts of other major industrial nations exercise
jurisdiction over foreign country defendants that have caused injury
within the nation; for instance, French courts will entertain a suit
brought by a French citizen against any defendant, anywhere in the
world, regardless of contacts with France. 218
Dean Peter Hay has observed:
There are good reasons why the American plaintiff should have
a local forum available when the foreign defendant has brought
about some contact with this country. These include the expense of
litigating abroad, the forum's interest in affording a remedy leading
to compensation, and the plaintiff's interest in the availability of
American procedural law (e.g., jury trial, discovery) .... But policy
does not make for constitutionality. 2 9
While Dean Hay certainly is correct that "policy does not make
for constitutionality," the policies he cites tend to counterbalance
policies generally counseling the courts against asserting jurisdiction
over foreign country defendants.22 0 In light of these countervailing
policies, the courts should proceed, with care, to consider on a case
by case basis assertions of jurisdiction over foreign country, as well
as domestic, defendants.
foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and into federal courts, thereby
reducing the potential for a multiplicity of conflicting results among the courts of
the 50 states." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983).
The Act also provides that personal jurisdiction over a foreign state exists so
long as that state is not entitled to immunity and has been served properly under
the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982). However, the Act provides that foreign states
are subject to suit with respect to acts done outside the United States only if "that
act causes a direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). This
statutory provision has been held to embody the International Shoe minimum
contacts standard. E.g., Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir.
1979) (per curiam); Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion
de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1980).
In addition to so providing in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608 (1982), Congress has provided in various other federal statutes for national
and international service of process. E.g., Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22
(1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982); Patent Act of
1952, 35 U.S.C. § 293 (1982). See also Packel, supra note 175 (suggesting that
Congress should enact a federal statute generally governing assertion of personal
jurisdiction over foreign country defendants).
217. Lilly, supra note 5, at 150.
218. Born, supra note 197, at 11-16; Note, supra note 211, at 705.
219. Hay, supra note 4, at 453 (footnotes omitted).
220. See notes 196-200 supra and accompanying text.
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The Asahi Court quite properly did not modify the International
Shoe minimum contacts standard for foreign country defendants. 221
Instead, the Court considered Asahi's national status as one of
"several factors" to be analyzed in determining whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction would offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. ' 222 When other factors in the "fair play
and substantial justice" balancing test point toward the exercise of
jurisdiction, such as when the plaintiff is a resident of the domestic
forum, personal jurisdiction over a foreign country defendant should
be upheld. Thus, by the reasoned application of the "fair play and
substantial justice" test, not only the interests of domestic plaintiffs
and fora, but of foreign country defendants, can be protected.
V. NON-DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS UPON THE EXERCISE OF STREAM
OF COMMERCE PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In light of the possibly expansive nature of stream of commerce
personal jurisdiction, judicial limitations in addition to those provided
221. Professor Gary Born recently has suggested that, not only should the due
process clause be interpreted to "require United States courts to use particular
caution in asserting long-arm jurisdiction over foreigners," but "it should require
closer connections between the forum and the defendant than are necessary in
domestic cases." Born, supra note 197, at 34. However, while "particular caution"
certainly is called for by such cases, any requirement of greater than minimum
forum contacts is problematic.
First of all, Professor Born concedes that it would be "difficult, and perhaps
unwise," to "specif[y] exactly how much closer a foreign defendant's connections
with the forum" should be. Id. at 36. Secondly, whatever problems may exist with
the minimum contacts test, that test has been applied for over forty years and the
courts are very familiar with it. Moreover, many scholars have advocated movement
away from the defendant bias inherent in the minimum contacts test, see note 136
supra, and it thus seems unwise to tilt that test even more strongly in favor of a
class of defendants regardless of the other interests implicated by particular cases.
Rather than attempting to modify the minimum contacts test, the interests of foreign
country defendants best can be accommodated within the balancing process employed
in all cases to determine whether personal jurisdiction would offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
222. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. Subsequent to its reliance in Asahi
on the general standard of "fair play and substantial justice," the Court addressed
the proper interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention in a suit brought against
a foreign country defendant. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). In Societe Nationale the Supreme
Court stressed that "American courts should ... take care to demonstrate due
respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant," but would not
"articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication." Id. at 2557.
In contrast to such a general standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has developed a seven-part test to determine the reasonableness of
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign country defendant. Hedrick v. Daiko
Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1983), modified, in part, on other
grounds, 733 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1984); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Marina
Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981). See note 69 supra (setting forth
the Ninth Circuit's test).
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by the due process clause may be appropriate in specific cases. This
section of the article considers the possible use of such non-due
process clause protections for either foreign or foreign country de-
fendants. The conclusion is reached that, while the Constitution's
commerce clause should not be considered separately in any stream
of commerce calculus, the forum non conveniens doctrine and federal
venue statute should be used to provide additional protections to
foreign and foreign country defendants. 223
A. The Commerce Clause as a Limitation Upon the Exercise of
Personal Jurisdiction
One possible limitation upon the stream of commerce doctrine
would be to apply a revitalized commerce clause as an additional
constitutional restraint upon personal jurisdiction. 224 Prior to its
decision in International Shoe, the Supreme Court invoked the in-
terstate commerce clause, rather than the due process clause, to
invalidate what the Court found to be overly expansive exercises of
personal jurisdiction by state courts. 225 Both before and after Inter-
223. In addition to the limitations on personal jurisdiction discussed in this
section, states also can constrain their assertions of jurisdiction by enacting less
expansive long arm statutes or interpreting their long arm statutes in a more restrictive
manner. However, instead of taking such actions, states generally have moved in
the opposite direction-enacting and interpreting long arm statutes as going to the
limits of constitutional due process. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 290 (1980); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
11. 2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West
1973).
As Professor Martin Louis has noted, "In close cases, state courts will naturally
tend to resolve jurisdictional doubts in their own favor. And sooner or later one
will announce a significant advance that the others will soon be pressed to follow."
Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment
on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L.
REv. 407, 431-32 (1980). See also Comment, supra note 175, at 160; Currie, supra
note 52, at 537. But see Jay, supra note 33, at 457-59.
Professor Abrams also has considered, but rejected, limitations on service of
process as an additional means of protecting defendants from any unfairness
stemming from an expansive assertion of personal jurisdiction. Abrams, Power,
Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
58 IND. L. REv. 1, 39-42 (1982).
224. The commerce clause of the United States Constitution provides that
"[tihe Congress shall have Power .. . [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States .... ." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although the
states are restricted in their attempts to regulate interstate, as well as foreign,
commerce by the commerce clause, "[w]hen construing Congress' power to 'regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations,' a more extensive constitutional inquiry is re-
quired." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
225. Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1929); Atchison, T.
& S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 103 (1924); Davis v. Farmers' Coop. Equity
Co., 262 U.S. 312, 316 (1923). The development of this line of cases was traced by
Judge Friendly in Scanapico v. Richmond, F.& P. R.R., 439 F.2d 17, 25-27 (1st
Cir. 1970) (rehearing en banc).
HeinOnline  -- 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 86 1987-1988
1987] PERSONAL JURISDICTION
national Shoe, lower federal and state courts relied upon these
Supreme Court precedents to strike down attempted exercises of
personal jurisdiction as violative of both the interstate226 and foreign 2 7
commerce clauses.
Several commentators have advocated that these commerce clause
cases be relied upon to establish an additional limitation upon the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign and foreign country
defendants. 22 In discussing the California Supreme Court's decision
in Asahi, one author recently suggested that "[a] revival of the
commerce clause limitation may . . . be essential, at least insofar as
ensuring that the free flow of international trade is not [unduly]
curtailed . "...1,229
However, in Calder v. Jones the Supreme Court refused to give
any special consideration to the first amendment implications of long
arm jurisdiction over a newspaper editor and reporter, rejecting the
"suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdic-
tional analysis. ' 230 As Professors James and Hazard have observed,
the Court's analysis in Calder "would seem also to repudiate giving
any special weight to the fact that a defendant's activity is governed
by the Commerce Clause." ' 23 ' Just as in the case of the first amend-
ment, "the infusion of [commerce clause] considerations would need-
226. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956);
Bryson v. The Northlake Hilton, 407 F. Supp. 73, 78 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Panstwowe
Zaklady Graviozne v. Automobile Ins. Co., 36 F.2d 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1928);
White v. Southern Pac. Co., 386 SW.2d 6, 9 (Mo. 1965) (per curiam). Judge
Sobeloff suggested in Erlanger Mills, 239 F.2d at 507, that "[i]t is difficult to
conceive of a more serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of commerce
between the states [than that resulting from the imposition of personal jurisdiction
upon a vendor in a forum distant from the place of sale]."
227. Overstreet v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 838, 839 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Klepper v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 271 A.D. 53, 56-58, 62 N.Y.S.2d 627,
629-30 (1946).
228. Comment, supra note 175, at 174-79 (in which the author argues that
"[t]he constitutional interest in facilitating interstate commerce seems to require
additional jurisdictional limitations beyond the minimum safeguards of causation,
notice, and relevance provided by due process"); Developments in the Law: State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 983-87 (1960) (advocating a continued
reliance upon the commerce clause as a limitation upon personal jurisdiction).
229. Kennedy, supra note 99, at 340-41. Cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), in which the Supreme Court struck down a
California tax on an instrumentality of foreign commerce as violative of the
commerce clause, because, inter alia, "California's tax prevents this Nation from
'speaking with one voice' in regulating foreign trade .... California, by its
unilateral act, cannot be permitted to place . . . impediments before this Nation's
conduct of its foreign relations and its foreign trade." 441 U.S. at 452, 453.
230. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). See also Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.,.465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984).
231. F. JAMs & G. HAzARD, supra note 198, § 2.32 at 103.
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lessly complicate an already imprecise jurisdictional] inquiry." 23 2
Accordingly, neither the interstate nor foreign commerce clause
should be interjected into the personal jurisdiction inquiry. Instead,
foreign and foreign country interests should be protected through
the existing due process requirement that personal jurisdiction not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." '233
B. The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as a Limitation Upon
The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction
In addition to the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdic-
tion stemming from the due process clause, foreign and foreign
country defendants, in appropriate cases, can invoke the protections
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. "The principle of forum
non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a
general venue statute. 23 4 This doctrine originated in Scotland and
later was adopted by state courts in this country. 235 Subsequently the
United States Supreme Court endorsed the use of the doctrine by
the federal courts in its 1947 decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.236
"Under Gilbert, dismissal ordinarily will be appropriate where
trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the
defendant or the court, and plaintiff is unable to offer any specific
reasons of convenience supporting his choice." 23 7 To guide the district
courts in exercising their discretion under this doctrine, the Gilbert
Court "provided a list of 'private interest factors' affecting the
convenience of the litigants, and a list of 'public interest factors'
affecting the convenience of the forum. '238
232. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. In rejecting any role for the first amendment
in the jurisdictional analysis, the Court also relied upon the fact that "the potential
chill on protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation
actions is already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the sub-
stantive law governing such suits." Id. For similar reasons, there is no basis for
interjecting the commerce clause into the jurisdictional analysis because the foreign
or foreign country status of the defendant already is considered in the minimum
contacts test. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033-35
(1987). See also notes 221-222 supra and accompanying text.
233. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
234. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment g (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 84 (1971). For a recent critique of forum non conveniens and an analysis
of its relationship to personal jurisdiction and choice of law, see Stewart, Forum
Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1986).
235. Bracher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REV. 908, 909-
12 (1947).
236. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See also Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.,
330 U.S. 518 (1947).
237. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981).
238. Id. at 241.
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The factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants
included the "relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive." The public factors bearing on the question included
the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the
"local interest in having localized controversies decided at home";
the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that
is at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance
of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application
of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an
unrelated forum with jury duty. 23 9
In its 1981 decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,2 ° the Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal of a wrongful death action brought on
behalf of Scottish decedents. The action was brought against the
United States corporations that had manufactured both an aircraft
that had crashed in Scotland and the aircraft's propeller. The Court
held that the district court had properly applied the Gilbert factors
and that the mere fact that the Scottish decedents' claim would be
subject to less favorable substantive tort law in Scotland did not
preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal. 24'
Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as thus
interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, should ameliorate at
least some of the burdens that a foreign or foreign country defendant
might be subject to under a stream of commerce doctrine of personal
jurisdiction. 242
239. Id. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09) (citations omitted).
240. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
241. Id. at 247-61. A prerequisite to any forum non conveniens dismissal is
the existence of an alternative forum. Id. at 254 n.22 ("At the outset of any forum
non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative
forum."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971); F. JAMES &
G. HAzARD, supra note 198, at § 2.31.
242. An Advisor on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws has recom-
mended that Congress, acting under its commerce clause powers, expand personal
jurisdiction by conferring nationwide service of process on all state and federal
courts with subject matter jurisdiction, subject only to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Packel, supra note 175.
Moreover, "American defendants have turned with increasing frequency to the
forum non conveniens doctrine because it has proven to be an effective means to
avoid litigating an international dispute in federal court." Note, Forum Non Con-
veniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 69 GEO. L. J. 1257, 1258
(1981). See also Recent Developments, Jurisdiction: Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non
Conveniens, and Litigation Against Multinational Corporations, 28 HARv. INT'L L.
J. 202, 209 (1987) (raising concern that forum non conveniens now may be used in
complex international litigation "as a defensive strategy instead of a means for
19871
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The minimum contacts rule requires that either the defendant have
some continuing relationship to the forum, such as residence, or
the transaction sued on have some significant relationship to the
forum. The forum non conveniens rule requires, more exactingly,
that the forum be not only minimally convenient, as required by
the minimum contacts rule, but also that it be relatively convenient
compared with other available forums. 243
Accordingly, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can, and
should, be used by United States courts to protect foreign and foreign
country defendants from suit in unduly unfair and inconvenient fora.
By so ameliorating potential hardships to defendants on a case by
case basis, the stream of commerce doctrine of personal jurisdiction
can be uniformly and consistently applied by both state and federal
courts.
C. Change of Venue as a Limitation Upon the Exercise of
Personal Jurisdiction
Potential hardship or unfairness to defendants in actions filed in
the federal courts also may be lessened in appropriate cases by a
change of venue. As the Supreme Court recognized in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, "[T]o the extent that it is inconvenient for a
party who has minimum contacts with a forum to litigate there, such
considerations most frequently can be accommodated through a
change of venue." 42 "
Under section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code,
"[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought. ' 245 Because
maximizing the convenience of the parties"). But see Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at
256 (claim of a foreign plaintiff "deserves less deference" than that of a domestic
plaintiff in forum non conveniens determination).
243. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 198, § 2.32 at 108. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 comment a (1971).
244. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483-84 (1985).
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). Section 1404(a) has been described as "em-
bod[ying] in an expanded version the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens,
under which a court in appropriate circumstances may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction in the interest of the 'easy, expeditious and inexpensive' resolution of a
controversy in another forum." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 n.20. See also Norwood
v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) ("Congress [in § 1404(a)] ... intended to
permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience [than is
necessary under forum non con veniens doctrine]."); Felicia, Ltd. v. Gulf Am. Barge,
Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 801, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
In addition to § 1404, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982) provides for transfer of
federal actions "to any district or division in which it could have been brought."
However, § 1406 only applies to actions "laying venue in the wrong division or
district." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982).
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federal venue generally is proper in either the judicial district in
which "all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose," 246 federal
defendants may be able to transfer actions to a more convenient
district within the federal system. Moreover, even with respect to an
action filed in state court, a defendant may be able to remove the
action to federal court and then move for a change of venue under
28 U.S.C. section 1404.247
Despite the possible utility of the federal venue provisions to
defendants sued in inconvenient federal districts, there remain serious
problems with exclusive reliance upon them to alleviate potential
defendant hardship and unfairness. For instance, situations will arise
in which there is no more convenient alternative district in which an
action "might have been brought" and to which transfer therefore
would be appropriate. 248 Of even greater significance to a foreign
country defendant is the fact that the federal venue statutes only
provide for change of venue within the United States.249
Nevertheless, because a federal court enjoys broader discretion
to order a change of venue than to dismiss a case due to forum non
conveniens,250 a defendant may be able to obtain a change of venue
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982) (diversity cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982)
(cases "wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship"). In
addition to the general venue provisions of § 1391, various federal statutes contain
special venue provisions pertaining to the particular federal statute in question. E.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982) (Labor Management Relations Act of 1947). Moreover, a special venue
provision covering foreign country defendants provides that "[an alien may be sued
in any district." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1982).
247. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (providing for removal by defendants of civil
actions over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction). Just such a removal
and change of venue were employed by the defendants in Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S.
at 240-41.
While under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 a defendant generally can remove a federal
question case without regard to the citizenship of the parties, a diversity case can
be removed only "if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) (1982).
248. Presumably, it will be most convenient for a party to defend an action
in the state of his or her own residence. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b) only
provide for venue in a defendant's district of residence if that district is where "all
defendants reside." Thus to the extent multiple defendants from different states are
sued in the same action, they may not be able to obtain a transfer to a more
convenient forum than that originally chosen by the plaintiff. Liaw Su Teng v.
Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984); Gallery House, Inc.
v. Yi, 587 F. Supp. 1036, 1039-40 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
249. Foreign country defendants, however, can seek the dismissal of, actions
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See notes 234-43 supra and accom-
panying text. Moreover, because an alien "may be sued in any district," 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(d) (1982), the possibilities for transfer within the United States may be great.
250. See note 245 supra.
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in a case in which the hardship necessary for a forum non conveniens
dismissal could not be shown.25 Although not providing protections
as expansive as the forum non conveniens doctrine, the federal venue
statutes can provide valuable supplemental protection to foreign and
foreign country defendants sued in an inconvenient federal forum.
The availability of both change of venue and forum non conveniens
dismissal should permit the federal courts to apply a more consistent
and predictable stream of commerce doctrine of personal jurisdiction
with respect to foreign and foreign country defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been twenty-six years since the Illinois Supreme Court,
acting "in ... light of the facts of economic life as it is lived
today," applied the stream of commerce doctrine to uphold personal
jurisdiction over a component parts manufacturer from another
state.252 Today's courts similarly should reflect contemporary eco-
nomic realities and, in appropriate cases, employ the stream of
commerce doctrine to uphold personal jurisdiction over foreign and
foreign country manufacturers and distributors.
With respect to foreign defendants, the courts should exercise
personal jurisdiction if a defendant was both aware that its products
would reach the forum and actually served the forum market. Service
of the market, in turn, should be determined by a consideration of
the volume and value of a defendant's products reaching the forum.
Personal jurisdiction over foreign country defendants should be
determined by this same minimum contacts test. However, the foreign
country status of a defendant should be considered by the court in
its determination whether, despite the existence of minimum forum
contacts, the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be fair and
reasonable. Having determined that personal jurisdiction constitu-
tionally can be asserted over a foreign or foreign country defendant,
a court still may grant a change of venue or forum non conveniens
251. The possibility of a change of venue also may affect the manner in which
a federal court interprets and applies the minimum contacts test for personal
jurisdiction. Thus in Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, the First Circuit refused to
uphold the dismissal, on personal jurisdiction grounds, of an action against a
defendant who was personally served while temporarily within the forum state
because "[alny legitimate showing a defendant may make as to fairness . . . is fully
cognizable under the change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), without impinging
on an established principle of jurisdiction. Dismissing the action altogether is
overkill." 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976). For an attempt to synthesize personal
jurisdiction and venue theory, see Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and
Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1981).
252. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
443, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
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dismissal to protect a defendant from litigation in an unfair or
unreasonable forum.
In the quarter century since the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,2 3 the
courts have refined the stream of commerce doctrine of personal
jurisdiction in a domestic setting. The jurisdiction exercised in Gray,
by an Illinois court over an Ohio manufacturer, is no longer consid-
ered novel or unique. During the final decade of this century, the
courts of this nation increasingly will be faced with efforts to assert
jurisdiction over defendants from other nations. By applying the
jurisdictional doctrines discussed in this article, the interests of all
parties and states, foreign and domestic, can best be protected.
253. 22 Il1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
19871
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